A Mixed Method Study Of A Former Special Operations Community: Identifying Factors That Effect Cross-Cultural Competency

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A MIXED METHOD STUDY OF A FORMER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMUNITY:
IDENTIFYING FACTORS THAT EFFECT CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCY

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ABSTRACT

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the United States caused a series of military events, including the planning and deployment of troops to Afghanistan. In less than a month after that infamous September day, military Special Forces (SF) members and officers from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were operating in Afghanistan. The SF and CIA members were faced with not only the difficult geographical terrain but were hampered by inadequate time to prepare for the complicated human terrain of the Afghan culture.

In the initial months of the war, these deficiencies were not evident; however, over the next decade, multiple cross-cultural failures in operations ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq, would have an impact on the culture of each nation, with bilateral frustration at best and suffering and death at worst. More than 15 years after 9/11, the military continues to operate in culturally challenging areas and struggles to prepare service members for such interactions. In 2017 the challenge remains how to increase every service member’s cross-cultural competency.

These research questions are used to examine a specific subculture of the military, known as the Special Operations community, to include Special Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members, and to explore the role cultural education may contribute to enhance individual performance.

Findings suggest that there are definitive differences within the Special Operation Force community and these differences can be correlated to the varying degrees of cross-cultural training and education. Further, there is evidence that additional and specialized training assisted certain members of the SOF to better navigate the human terrain and understand the intricate
nature of cross-cultural understanding. Additionally, it is clear there are areas needing improvement in the entire SOF community and the military in general.

Conclusions realized from this study demonstrate the necessity for cross-cultural training and education as an important complement to the Band-Aids-and-bullets mentality in securing bilateral success in the varying human terrain for all stakeholders. It is essential for the Department of Defense and the SOF commands to identify where, when, what, and how to implement formal cross-cultural programs for the future success of the United States war fighting and peace keeping missions, as well as to serve the alliances of multinational collaborations.
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DEDICATION

Thank you Don Dobrook, whom I met in 1999 when Don was assigned as my case manager for a U.S. Veterans’ program that got me back into the classroom. Don is a unique person with the knowledge to lead combined with a heart and passion to help. Since I met Don he has championed my continuing education, never gave up on me, even when I gave up on myself. Don has served as a mentor, cheerleader, and most importantly as a friend and brother. Don, here we are at the conclusion of my academic cycle but certainly not the end of my education.

To my mother and children, a father looks to be a role model to his children and for them to achieve their goals in life. His job as a father is to inspire them to be the best at whatever they want to be. I continue to be a life long learner and sincerely hope to pass this drive along to each of you. My father shared a wonderful thought when I was a very small boy. I am unclear of its origin but all the same it is a great philosophy that has stayed with me throughout my life. “Would the boy I was be proud of the man I am?” Today, I ask you to keep that in mind as you continue to grow as adults and continue to ask question throughout your own lives.

To my wife Dana, for your continuous support and for setting an academic example that inspired me to grow as a learner. I will forever be grateful for your undying support and devotion to make me grow as a human. The personal and family time you sacrificed that allowed me to pursue this journey only demonstrates your contribution to us. You have always been and remain the lighthouse that guided me and encouraged my goal to be a life long learner.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

These pages offer a personal acknowledgement of all those who have encouraged me and assisted me through my research. From friends to professional colleagues previously unknown, I have found a wealth of acceptance and assistance along this journey, most importantly to the men and women of the Armed Forces and other government agencies who selflessly place themselves in the line of fire to serve the people of the United States, who will never truly understand why you do what you do and the sacrifices you make. You all continue to impress me with your loyalty and sense of duty to one another and your pride in serving your country. You are truly noble people and deserve the respect of others.

Meeting people along the journey has been a rewarding adventure. Further, discussing cultural intelligence is a passion, and I have found sharing this knowledge is stimulating for all sides in the conversation. Special thank you to Dr. Grania Holman as my committee chair advisor and personal coach and cheerleader in this journey and thank you to my other committee members at UNE, Dr. Collay, Dr. Benson, and Dr. Carlos Braziel.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Against an enemy who fights unconventionally . . . it is more important to understand motivation, intent, method, and culture than to have a few more meters of precision, knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth.

Robert H. Scales, *Culture Centric Warfare*

Bo Parker grew up in a small town just outside Topeka, Kansas, the only child of a state trooper father and a banker mother. His high school graduating class consisted of one hundred thirty-five students, most of whom, like Bo, were white, middle class, and had known each other for more than a decade. After graduation, 18-year-old Bo joined the United States Marine Corps, and flew to San Diego, California, for recruit training. Not only was it the first time Bo had been on an airplane, it was the first time he had been out of Kansas.

The Marine Corps was an alien world to Bo. While being part of a team was familiar to him—he had played football and baseball in school—he had never before encountered the ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity he found among his new Marine brothers. When other recruits asked him what he was, Bo would simply reply “American,” an answer that only solicited more questions. “No, what are you? Italian, Irish, French, what?” This followup question further confused him, as he had never known anyone to identify as anything other than American. Bo was not in Kansas anymore.

After completing recruit training, Bo left the protective bubble of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot and went to Infantry Training School (ITS) in Camp Pendleton, California. While only forty-five miles north of San Diego, Pendleton seemed to be a new world. Bo met seasoned Marines who regaled him with war stories of courageous adventures, narrow escapes, and of a
primitive enemy who was savage and cunning, more animal than human. At the end of his ITS training, Bo was eager to join their ranks to collect stories of his own.

Six months after he left Kansas, Bo received orders for his first deployment to the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. As a newly minted member of the world’s most elite military fraternity, Bo flew over the Hindu Kush Mountains armed with knowledge and training his younger self could never have imagined. He marveled at his journey and the jagged beauty of the landscape below him, but this confidence and wonder would soon be replaced by fear, confusion, and a deep sense of isolation.

Bo was three weeks into his tour, waiting for his first combat experience, eager to employ his training and his weapon. On his first patrol, he glanced to his right and saw two boys playing in the road, kicking a half deflated soccer ball down the pitted Humvee tire ruts.

With no warning, explosions followed by mortar rounds and small arms fire erupted around Bo and his platoon. Training took over as Bo hit the ground. He looked up and surveyed the scene. The two boys lay sprawled in the dirt, their bodies lifeless. Violent screams from his fellow Marines were heard, Bo swiveled. He saw Chris, a fellow Marine, writhing on the ground, shouting at him. Wild thoughts fired in rapid succession as Bo moved. His eyes searched for cover while his left arm grabbed the top of Chris’ drag strap. He found a trench about two body lengths away and dragged himself and the nearly unconscious Chris down into the fetid liquid at the bottom of the trench. Within moments, other Marines joined Bo and Chris in their makeshift fighting hole. The Marines were cussing the enemy yet calmly ordering other Marines to locate the enemy positions and put together a plan to stop the enemy advance and to kill them. A Navy Corpsman jumped into the trench and immediately tended to Chris. Bo was ordered to position himself above the trench to cover the road that ran parallel to their position.
He lay on the bank and faced the road, weapon ready, feet lying below him in the heady mix of sewage and Chris’ blood.

The mortar rounds stopped, but the rustling of the poppies sounded like a heavy metal band’s thrumming hiss to Bo’s adrenalin-addled brain. He heard the motorcycle, a dusty Honda Avenger with a grating engine, before he saw it. Determined to execute his orders and to protect his wounded friend, Bo placed himself between his brothers and the approaching bike. He screamed and waved his hands above his head, motioning the rider to stop, a gesture he was sure anyone would understand. The bike continued its approach and then began to accelerate. Bo raised and aimed his weapon. He rotated the safety switch to fire, relaxed his breathing, and placed his finger on the trigger.

Just as Bo was ready to squeeze his first shot, his sergeant ordered him to stand down. Angry and confused, the young Marine demanded to know why he had been stopped. The sergeant, a seasoned veteran of the war in Afghanistan, explained to Bo that he had given the motorcyclist the wrong hand gesture. In this culture, yelling and waving your arms, as Bo had done, was a signal to proceed quickly through the area, not to stop. The motorcyclist had been trying to follow Bo’s instructions.

Statement of the Problem

A gap in cross-cultural competency training affects our military service members in the performance of their missions, increasing the opportunity for costly mistakes, injury, and death to stakeholders. The need for cross-cultural cooperation has grown exponentially with the closing of the 20th century. Arguably, there remains a deficiency in cross-cultural competency, which causes a major dilemma for a global community, which has never been more intertwined. This accelerated expansion started with the World Wide Web and continued to expand in all
areas of business, government, geopolitical actions, and international terrorism. This research concentrates on the military sector and examines the Special Operation Force community, thus the research will focus heavily on the terrorism aspect of the global community and the need for cross-cultural competency in a military context.

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon triggered a level of awareness of terrorism never before known in the United States. The attacks prompted the United States to immediately shift to a defensive posture by shutting down airspace and preparing for other possible attacks on the homeland. In the days after 9/11, Americans rallied together, along with gathering united support from the international community. It was only a matter of time before the United States would respond with force. The expected use of power was assumed by Americans and acceptable to most of the international community in its openly expressed and unconditional support for the United States. As the federal, state, and local leadership concentrated on the recovery operation, the military leadership prepared to respond with force against terrorism that would initially concentrate on Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, but would soon turn in to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

When the first Special Forces (SF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers arrived in Afghanistan 15 days after 9/11, the United States was unprepared for the cultural aspect of a war in a region like Afghanistan. Nevertheless, these SF and CIA officers laid the groundwork for the official United States military assault, which commenced on October 7, 2001 (Taddeo, 2010). Understandably, priority was not given to cross-cultural education in Afghanistan, as at that moment in time all focus was on ousting and killing the terrorists. The notion of winning hearts and minds would follow much later in the continued GWOT.
Afghanistan presented a difficult physical and cultural terrain. Ranging from the austere Hindu Kush Mountains to the high desert plains found throughout much of the country, the country’s roads and infrastructure were at the level expected of a poor, developing nation made worse by the damage inflicted throughout the area from decades of ethnic and religious fighting. Culturally, Afghanistan is made up of approximately 60 major and 400 minor Pashtun tribes speaking more than thirty languages, an interesting and challenging cultural mixture (The Economist, 2008).

As the invasion of Afghanistan continued, the mission quickly took on a political dimension that required an Afghan face be placed on the war; in particular, the search for Osama bin Laden (Schmitt & Shanker, 2011). This proved to be a nearly impossible military and cultural undertaking, because previous to the invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan military was virtually nonexistent, and tribal warlords and the Taliban ruled the country. Consequently, Afghanistan presented the enormous challenge of fighting a stateless, asymmetrical enemy in an extremely difficult physical and cultural terrain. As such, language, religion, morals, and ethics became as important as any other consideration on the battlefield (Thompson & Jetly, 2014).

In 2003 the war on terror shifted to the invasion of Iraq, and United States and Coalition Forces were faced with an entirely different physical and cultural terrain than that faced in Afghanistan. Iraq was more the urban environment of a developed nation, separated by vast spaces of wind-swept desert dotted by hundreds of date palm groves, yet Iraq leaves the impression of modernity.

In spite of this sense of modernity, Iraq presented immense cultural challenges. Ruled by the vicious and repressive Sunni Muslim minority government of Saddam Hussein in a majority Shia Muslim country, Coalition Forces faced a confusing patchwork of Sunni and Shia Arabs,
Iraqi Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen. As a consequence of not understanding the culture, a vacuum was created quickly after the invasion. Sepp (2007) confronts the issue that this vacuum allowed the war on terror to spread well beyond Iraq, with involvement continuing in Northern Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Turkey. Furthermore, Sepp (2007) argues that with this daunting task of winning hearts and minds through a mix of languages and cultures, cross-cultural awareness preparedness has become an essential requirement for success in both the military and political aspects of the global war on terror.

While Bo’s story is fictional, it is a narrative derived from several Marines that resonates in current diverse challenges faced by military service members. After more than fifteen years and over a billion dollars spent on research to deliver to the battlefield a cross-culturally competent warrior, the Department of Defense (DoD) has yet to settle on a universal tool to assess cross-culture competency (3C) (Gallus, et al., 2014). To further aggravate this issue is a shrinking military budget, as the DoD calls upon its leaders to do more with less (McManus, 2012). Senior Army leader General Raymond Odierno made several comments from lessons learned in Iraq, emphasizing the need for improved cultural awareness and the importance of the human domain (McManus, 2012). General Odierno stated, “the best equipped army in the world can still lose a war if it doesn’t understand the people it's fighting” (McManus, 2012, p. 3).

The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent years have proved challenging for a political and military leadership that has had to manage two different wars in two different cultures. The United States continues to provide Special Operation Forces to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS in the Western world and Daesh in the Middle East. To overpower such groups, the need for cross-cultural competency may be argued
to be one of the emerging challenges facing the Department of Defense (DoD) and research has identified 3C as a necessity to meet the diverse human terrain (Gallus, et al., 2014).

Two of the greatest concerns for cross-cultural challenges are to assist service members to function at a higher capacity in different cultures and to provide leadership with an improved approach to defeat the enemy by understanding its culture (Gallus, et al., 2014). To reach an acceptable level of cultural awareness, cross-cultural competency is an agreed-upon concept by military leadership and academic professionals as a vital contributor to mission success (Gallus et al., 2014). However, what has not been agreed on is how to get there, or even where “there” is. The problem continues to rest in how to establish, understand, and change a warrior’s cultural competency (Gallus et al., 2014).

The United States military continues to revise its current training programs to better prepare forces to meet missions. To do that, the DoD begins by defining a term to be used in its understanding of cultural awareness called Cross-Cultural Competency (3C). Cross-Cultural Competency is a “set of knowledge, skills, and affect motivation that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments” (Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007, p. vii). This definition supports all missions that are expected of the service members, whether peacekeeping, humanitarian, or combat; undoubtedly all of these missions place the service members in cross-cultural environments.

By defining 3C, the DoD is responsible for implementing a method based on identifying vulnerabilities in service member’s 3C. Further, there is the responsibility to educate service members to improve their competency and cultural awareness, with the understanding that this provides bilateral global success. To be clear, cultural awareness is not the same as cultural intelligence and competence (Livermore, 2015). The approach to cross-cultural understanding
through merely the use of cultural awareness training fails to account for many variables such as cognitive, emotion, motivation, and behavior modification factors (Livermore, 2015).

**Purpose of Study**

The purpose of this study is to provide new research to better prepare men and women of the armed forces for the cross-cultural challenges needed for mission success. The study offers new research to address the problems of cultural competency through a mixed method approach with the collection of relevant data from the target sample population. The former Special Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members offer an excellent opportunity for insight, as well as being a target sample group not well researched.

This research utilized a combination of quantitative and qualitative surveys selected to identify what role, if any, cultural education has played in the careers of the target population members. Additionally, the data allow the researcher to compare variants between the groups and identify possible beneficial impact areas unique to one group or to one person. The literature review demonstrates a demand for better cross-cultural training.

The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced events that demonstrate a lack of cultural understanding. For example, the case that drew a vast amount of negative cross-cultural attention was the Iraq Abu Ghraib prison story. This was a highly controversial mishandling of prisoners that had global consequences. This story generated international condemnation of the United States’ policy and is evidence something is wrong with the military’s efforts on cross-cultural education. Further, this event and others like it highlight the importance of cross-cultural understanding and competency for mission success. Finally, the
The aim of this study is to add to existing research that allows others to build on the results provided in this study.

**Research Questions**

**Research Question 1**

How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?

H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships with their mission enabling them to take on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members by living and operating within a different culture setting.

H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships with their mission causing them to take on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members by living and operating within a different culture setting.

**Research Question 2**

How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98 countries and over 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?

H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Cultural Intelligence Centers Database.

H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the Cultural Intelligence Center database.
**Research Question 3**

How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute and correlate with the CQS survey?

H3o. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlations patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.

H3a. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover correlations patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.

**Conceptual Framework**

The research is grounded in two major concepts: Cross-cultural competence and assessment of cultural competence. The method presented allows access to and monitors service members’ levels of cross-cultural competency through the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS). The research explores how that data and the additional mixed method surveys may be used to further research in the advancement of 3C. This includes cross-cultural education, cross-cultural training, immersion in cross-cultural environments, higher motivation, and behavior modification.

The study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative collection methods. Creswell (2012) argues that when quantitative and qualitative methods are combined the design becomes a mixed method design (p. 535). Further, Creswell (2012) offers varieties of the mixed method design. For this study, the value of the quantitative data is substantial. As such, this data must be given first priority when combining the quantitative and qualitative data, what Creswell refers to as a two-part study or an explanatory sequential design (2012). Two approaches are used in this research. The first includes two surveys: a demographic survey and the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) survey; and a quantitative survey that provides critical data regarding group scores,
standings between groups, and a comparison with the 58,000 member database at the Cultural Intelligence Center (Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016).

The second approach utilizes a qualitative survey to gather personal expressions of the participants and uses this information to further develop conclusions in figures 1 and 2.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1.** Through application of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) developed by the Center for Cultural Intelligence (2015), the scores from the two groups are derived.
Scope, Limitations, and Assumptions

This study examines two distinct groups consisting of former members of the special operations community. The research utilizes a cross-section of former Special Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) community, with participants representing the Navy SEALs Special Boat Unit, the Marine Corps Reconnaissance community, Marine Snipers and Marine Special Operations Command Raider Battalions, Army Rangers, Air Force Para Rescue and Special Operations Aviation Regiment and Special Forces (Green Beret) members. One of the limitations of this study was the difficulty of working with active duty military and the requirements of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) process from both the university and the military. As a result, the research concentrates on former service members representing the above SOF and MEUSOC groups. An additional limitation of this study is the need to employ distance-based research methods vis-à-
vis online surveys due to the researcher’s location in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the varied locations of the research participants.

The research relies on several assumptions. First, it must be assumed that cultural intelligence (CQ), which is measured through the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS), is a form of knowledge independent of other kinds of knowledge and is distinctly measurable through the CQS. Second, the framework established by Earley and Ang (2003) assumes that CQ is the force behind cultural success in the diverse community that forms the database of the Cultural Intelligence Center.

The final assumption pertains to the CQS as self-report survey based on a participant’s self-perception. The researcher assumes that participants are both truthful and able to report accurately on their knowledge and behavior. This point has been of some concern among academics and was addressed in the DoD’s annotated bibliography, which suggests that self-evaluations alone may not relay accurately the truth of one’s cross-cultural competency (Gallus et al., 2014).

Significance of the Study

The focus of this research is two-fold. First, the research will examine the correlations and variants between the sample Groups A and B. The research will identify similarities and differences between the groups as well as assess the data against the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database of over 58,000 professionals, which currently represents 98 countries as of December 2016 (Van Dyne, Ang & Koh, 2015). Second, the research will examine the data collected in an open-ended qualitative survey provided by the sample group members. This data provides personal documentation of the groups’ understanding, use, and implementation of cross-cultural knowledge.
The literature review provides a foundation that acknowledges the cultural challenges in modern-day, asymmetrical warfare and the requirement for the use of cross-cultural techniques to increase mission success. The study also presents perspectives that emerge through a review of scholarly writings to examine the concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ), discuss the impact of the cultural terrain on military outcomes in irregular warfare, and review the methodological philosophies behind the current training of service members, especially Marines and Special Operation Force warriors.

The military has been the subject of decades-long exploratory research in the field of cross-cultural relationships. However, further research is needed to determine how the military can train its warriors to navigate the cultural terrain of operational environments. One possible emerging approach to such training involves increasing service members’ level of cross-cultural competency through increased cultural intelligence.

An overwhelming majority of scholars and military leaders agree that some form of cultural awareness training is critical to navigate the cultural terrain today and the future (Gallus et al., 2014). Yet, after more than 15 years of fighting and over a billion dollars invested in confronting the topic of culture, the military has only identified the importance in developing a cross-cultural competent warrior program (Gallus et al., 2014). Indeed, an argument can be made that the Department of Defense continues to fall short in how to measure and then to increase 3C. The study’s significance lies in its focus on the value of the Cultural Intelligence Scale as a measurement tool through the assessment of the two sample groups. The expectation is the findings will contribute to future research and the integration of cultural intelligence and cross-cultural competency to assist military communities in training culturally competent warriors.
Working Definitions

- Adaptive Performance: addresses one’s overall ability to alter one’s behavior, which allows one to adapt to a new environment or situation; in the case of this research and literature review, this relates to cross-cultural situations.

- Behavioral CQ: is also referred to as CQ Action (Livermore, 2011). It is one’s ability to exhibit verbal and non-verbal signs of communication when interacting in a cross-cultural setting. This includes appropriate behavior in these settings (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). It is the backbone of one’s interaction in a multicultural setting, as it demands constant attention to one’s bearing and presentation so as to not offend anyone. It mixes closely with motivation, as it requires a constant vigilance to operate in demanding situations (Livermore, 2010).

- Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL): The Marine Corps component of cultural and language training center, based out of Quantico and affiliated with the Marine Corps University.

- Cognitive Intelligence: the lowest order between metacognitive and cognitive that examines an individual’s norms, practices, and conceived concepts of information realms but in this context relates to cultural concepts. This is usually gained through education, social interactions, and family ideas that are already deeply embedded in a person at a young age (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

- Cross-Cultural Competency (3C): is a “set of knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments” (Gallus et al., 2014, p. vi)
• **Cultural Intelligence (CQ):** is defined as an individual’s aptitude to function and to operate smoothly in cross-cultural settings. This is designed for real-world application motivated by the reality of the global work place that requires individuals to operate in multicultural settings. It does not take away from IQ, SQ, EQ or any other measureable quality, as it concentrates only on the cross-cultural setting. Early and Ang (2003) worked on moving beyond cognitive abilities to define what differentiates CQ from the rest by the ability to remain non-culturally specific, thus allowing the user to operate efficiently in any cultural setting (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

• **Emotional Intelligence (EQ):** deals with the individual’s ability to handle emotions and is closely related to CQ, as they are both based outside of academia and based on real-world settings (Ang & Dyne, 2008). The major difference is that one’s EQ may be high in one cultural setting with which they are familiar. However, this approach does not work in every culture thus making it culturally specific, whereas CQ is not culturally specific.

• **Force Multiplier:** any added element, equipment, training, intelligence, or other capability that increases the success of a unit or battle. For this research it considers CQ, 3C, and other cross-cultural tools that assist the service member.

• **General Intelligence (IQ):** is the ability to focus and make decisions correctly with outside diversions. This is not culturally specific and relates to any abstract situation.

• **Global War on Terrorism:** the term GWOT came about shortly after the attack of September 11, 2001. In early October 2001, President George W. Bush initiated operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda group members hiding in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda operated and from where they operated terrorist training camps.
• Human Terrain System: this was an extremely well funded social science experiment backed by Washington, D.C. Its importance in this study is to understand that not every social experiment proves effective for the military. Other issues faced included the reality that placing social scientists in war zones proved difficult. The members were made up of mostly anthropology PhDs tasked to provide information, later described as intelligence, on the local civilian population, to U.S. military leaders. They were to be the eyes and the ears of the cultural landscape and to report how to operate within the cultural terrain. At times, the scientists’ information may have been used to form tactical decisions, including those leading to casualties of war.

• Metacognitive: refers to an individual’s level of conscious cultural awareness during cross-cultural interactions and is considered the highest order of the cognitive processes (Ang & Dyne, 2008). People with strength in metacognitive CQ consciously question their own cultural assumptions, reflect during interactions, and adjust their cultural knowledge when interacting with those from other cultures. Metacognitive CQ involves higher-level cognitive strategies that allow individuals to develop new heuristics and rules for social interaction in novel cultural environments by promoting information processing at a deeper level (Ang & Dyne, 2008). Additionally, some people group metacognitive with cognitive, which may cause confusion in some references in the literature.

• Motivational CQ: is also referred to as CQ Drive (Livermore, 2011). It is one’s capability to drive attention and energy to the task at hand. In this case, one must demonstrate motivation in a cross-cultural setting to make every attempt to control a positive outcome in given situations. There are two requirements to accomplish this task. The first is the
expectation of successful accomplishment of the task and the second is the ability to see the value associated with accomplishing that task (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

- Special Forces or Green Berets: is the Army’s counterinsurgent force. They have many other missions but are of special interest to this study as they primarily operate in cross-cultural environments.

- Special Operation Forces: the study examines a group combined of special warfare operators from all military branches, including: Marine Corps Special Operations Command with Raiders and Force Recon, Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces (Green Beret) and Army Rangers, Air Force Para Rescue and Combat Control Teams.

- Social Intelligence (SQ): is one’s ability to get along with others in social settings, the success of which is measured in both verbal and in nonverbal actions and based on many learned skills (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

- Warrior Diplomat: A term used primarily in the Special Forces community; however, it is now an academic term used to describe SOF members who struggle with two missions: the first as a warrior, and the second as a diplomat.

- Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC): The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)) is a Marine expeditionary unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment that is trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized missions of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The MEU(SOC) is not a Special
Operations force but, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commander, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable.

**Conclusions**

David Livermore (2015), of the Cultural Intelligence Center, reveals there has been a recognized deficiency in studying the military and the primary focus in the development of cross-cultural representatives has been concentrated on the global marketplace and the business community. The military is a logical participant that could prove an invaluable addition to the cultural intelligence CQ literary body of work.

The aforementioned story of Bo Parker provides an explanation of the difficulties in the absurd normality of war that troops face. Men and women will continue to encounter a ruthless enemy, which they are responsible to fight while maintaining a conscious effort to remain cross-culturally competent. This factor is extremely important as warriors fight near or among non-combatant civilians as the civilian population that surrounds the battlefield is a regrettable reality of war. Such reality must be dealt with in a proactive manner, not a reactive one. The notion of winning hearts and minds has been a longstanding policy implemented by presidential administrations and is synonymous with defeating the enemy. Yet, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) uncovered an enemy that is a cunningly indigenous, unconventional, and an irregular warrior unlike that of a conventional military force (Jones, 2012). Further, the enemy does not easily defer to a civilian-friendly concept, as they continue to apply their own terroristic strategy counter to the strategy of winning of hearts and minds.

For the most part, the leadership has been faced with a nationless enemy, one who is not supported nor directed by one single government but is driven by mixed causes. To further
complicate the issue, the enemy is indistinguishable by the unifying factor of a common military uniform, as he dresses exactly like the local civilian population (Jones, 2012). Working with the culture is critical in these types of warfare, and exploiting a local population for intelligence, assistance, and resistance against this type of enemy demands cultural competency by all stakeholders.

Cultural intelligence has proved highly successful in the business sector and, when used throughout the international community, can serve as a force to be embraced by the military community (Spencer & Balasevicius, 2009). Further, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has invested enormous sums of money and countless years in pursuit of a cultural advantage (Gallus et al., 2014). This researcher hopes the findings serve as an essential contribution to the existing literature on the link between the military, education, and cultural intelligence, and its future within the military culture.
CHAPTER 2

Review of the Literature

And when people are entering upon war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*

Chapter one introduced the complex problem of integrating an effective cross-cultural awareness method in the military. The Department of Defense (DoD) has experienced the struggles associated with confronting cross-cultural conundrums. In particular, identifying a reliable assessment method to review the service members’ level of cultural awareness and a realistic approach to increasing DoD cross-culture competency. This chapter presents existing literature over cross-cultural research, cross-cultural awareness, military cross-cultural competency, how cross-cultural training is managed in smaller elite units, and case studies of success and failures since 9/11. Finally, this chapter will identify areas where future research may prove productive.

This literature review is organized in two key parts. Part one focuses on the importance of understanding culture and cross-cultural communication defined from a social science context. This is a critical area where the literature review will examine culture, establish techniques and tools to measure an individual’s culture awareness, and provide an introduction to cultural intelligence (CQ) and the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment survey, which will be the primary tool used in the research design. Part two will examine DoD’s previous and current path and challenges to win hearts and minds through cross-cultural training in the search for cross-cultural competency.
The literature review examines the military in general and, although the entire DoD as an organization is used throughout the review, the research focuses on smaller, elite units that since 9/11 have demonstrated arguably higher cross-cultural exposure. The researcher’s intent in examining smaller units such as the Marine Corps and Special Operation Forces communities is to present a more practical micro-approach to the study, which fits best into this type of academic dissertation process. It is also important to note that this research focuses primarily on utilizing modern data and literature from the post 9/11 era.

**Part I**

**Understanding Culture Through the Lens of Social Science**

To fully comprehend the concept of cross-cultural preparedness, it is necessary to first define what culture is from a social science perspective. Because the definition of culture itself may constitute a subjective, confusing mix of values, behaviors, and beliefs, no single definition is likely to satisfy all social scientists. For the purposes of this dissertation, some shared understanding of a definition of culture is necessary.

**Definitions of Culture**

The University of Minnesota’s Center for the Advanced Research on Language Acquisition (CARLA), defines culture as “shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization” (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 1). These consistent patterns distinguish the members of one cultural group from another group.

James A. Banks and Cherry A. McGee Banks argue that culture is not an object, but instead a byproduct of all the interpretations of those objects that provide a sense of who a people are and where they come from (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2).
Most social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of human societies. The essence of a culture is not its artifacts, tools, or other tangible cultural elements, but how the members of the group interpret, use, and perceive them. It is the values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that distinguish one people from another in modernized societies, not material objects and other tangible aspects of human societies (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2). People within a culture usually interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the same or in similar ways (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2).

Louise Damien defines culture as “learned and shared human patterns or models for living; day-to-day living patterns. These patterns and models pervade all aspects of human social interaction. Culture is mankind’s primary adaptive mechanism” (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 3).

According to John and Ruth Useem, “Culture has been defined in a number of ways, but most simply, as the learned and shared behavior of a community of interacting human beings” (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 9).

Numerous other definitions of culture exist, but for the purposes of this study the definition provided by John Paul Lederach, that “culture is the shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social realities around them,” seems to be most useful (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 7).

**Hofstede’s six intercultural dimensions.** If culture is “shared knowledge,” then culture, according to Geert Hofstede, must be “learned through a process of socialization” (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 4). Consequently, if culture can be learned through exposure to another culture (i.e., socialization), the hopes of the military to increase the cultural competency and
Awareness of soldiers at the front lines is not futile. However, if it can be argued that there are some learned traits and behaviors that allow certain individuals to be more receptive to and successful in multi-cultural settings, then several important questions follow. Answers to these questions would allow leaders to identify why certain individuals are able to perform more successfully than others in multi-cultural environments.

- What trait or traits allow one person to accept, adapt to, or adopt another culture more easily and quickly than his or her colleagues?
- Is there a way to measure a person’s ability to learn and accept culture?
- What factors have an impact on a person’s ability to do this?

To begin identifying those behaviors and values that contribute to cross-cultural success, Geert Hofstede breaks down culture into several dimensions that describe the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its members, and how these values relate to behavior (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2011, p. 7).

![Hofstede Cultural Dimensions](image)

*Figure 3. Hofstede’s Six Intercultural Dimensions Model (Anastasia, 2015).*
Hofstede’s Six Intercultural Dimensions may be defined in more detail as follows:

1. Power Distance: This dimension explains the extent to which members who are less powerful in a society accept and expect that the distribution of power takes place unequally (Anastasia, 2015).

2. Uncertainty Avoidance: It is a dimension that describes the extent to which people in society are not at ease with ambiguity and uncertainty (Anastasia, 2015).

3. Individualism vs. Collectivism: The focus of this dimension is on the question of whether people prefer being left alone to look after themselves or want to remain in a closeknit network (Anastasia, 2015).


5. Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation: Long-term orientation describes the inclination of a society toward searching for virtue. Short-term orientation pertains to those societies that are strongly inclined toward the establishment of the absolute truth (Anastasia, 2015).

6. Indulgence vs. Restraint: This revolves around the degree to which societies can exercise control over their impulses and desires (Anastasia, 2015).

Each dimension of Hofstede’s model identifies certain specific challenges the military faces in training culturally adaptive warriors. The military, of course, is founded on the expected unequal distribution of power through the concept of chain of command. Understanding the Hofstede & Hofstede (2011) model could easily lead to a feeling of superiority of military
service members over less developed inferior people. This feeling would be compounded when dealing with native populations for whom unequal distribution of power is not as ingrained at it is in the military. By the same token, neither ambiguity nor uncertainty is encouraged by the concept of the chain of command, yet situations in which the military is interacting with a local population are fraught with a high degree of uncertainty.

Simply put, members of the military operate based on a “shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social realities around them” (Lederach, 1995, p. 9). This problem is further exacerbated by the fact military members represent a greater selection of America's cross-culture society, which allows the military the ability to operate with an unequal distribution of power, further ensuring the avoidance of ambiguity and uncertainty. Furthermore, one of the premier values of the military, particularly at the level of the combat unit, is loyalty to the group in what Hofstede calls “Collectivism.”

This intense loyalty to one’s brothers and sisters in arms creates a powerful in-group culture, that sees anyone outside the group as a less trusted “other,” making building trusting relations with a foreign population extremely difficult. Combining this lack of trust with combat environments and the culture of masculinity so pervasive in the military results in a sharp contrast to those cultures that show a higher preference for qualities found in Hofstede’s femininity dimension (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2011). For example, Islam has a higher requirement for modesty and Bedouin tribal communities share a deeper sense for cooperation and quality of life (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2011).

Finally, the short-term orientation that characterizes American culture in general is quite different from the long-term perspective that characterizes many native cultures that are centuries
old. Furthermore, restraint is not a highly regarded value in America, particularly in its youth. In short, Hofstede’s model describes the monumental task the military faces in creating a “boots on the ground” force sensitized to the immense demands of cross-cultural understanding and interaction.

The cultural iceberg theory. If Hofstede’s six intercultural dimension’s help define the challenges faced by the military in developing an understanding of other cultures, the “Cultural Iceberg Theory” identifies one possible way forward. Originally developed by Edward T. Hall in his book Beyond Culture (1976), Hall argues that culture is like an iceberg. In figure 4 the tip of the iceberg represents those parts of a culture that are visible, while those much larger parts of a culture are represented by the part of the iceberg that is below the water and thus not immediately visible.
Figure 4. The cultural iceberg drawing demonstrates the surface and sub-surface of cultural dimensions (Hall, 2017).

The external component of the iceberg encompasses the conscious part of a culture, including immediately visible aspects, such as dress, art, literature, food, religion, and language. Conversely, the internal, unconscious aspects of a culture are represented by those parts of the iceberg that are below water, thus not immediately seen, such as unspoken beliefs, values, and thoughts. In fact, it is possible to argue these are the very unspoken aspects of culture identified by Hofstede.

According to Hall, (1976) for anyone in business or in the military to navigate successfully within a foreign culture, developing knowledge of and actively participating in the visible tip of the iceberg is essential, as well as actively seeking to understand those parts of the culture that are not immediately visible (Bennett, 2004, p. 10). As Dr. Paula Calligiuri (2012)
points out, developing the proficiency to operate in unfamiliar cultures clearly involves more than the acquisition of cultural facts or the ability to overcome cultural bias. Cross-cultural success requires the application of a cultural agility that enables one to integrate learned skills into a broader cultural awareness (Calligiuri, 2012).

**Cross-Cultural Assessment Tools**

There is a preexisting correlation between the military and academic psychology dating back to the First World War. Building on the work of French psychologist Alfred Binet, the military developed a wide range of psychological testing due to the need for vocational assessment, placement, and training. Because of the military’s awareness that involvement in warfare could have dramatic consequences for the mental health and wellbeing of its personnel, the military has continued this relationship with academia (Pols & Oak, 2007). During the 20th century, U.S. military psychiatrists tried to deal with the consequences of combat while contributing to the military’s tradition of supporting its personnel and reducing the debilitating impact of psychiatric episodes (Pols & Oak, 2007). Screening programs were implemented to detect factors that predispose individuals to mental disorders, thus setting the stage for early intervention strategies for acute war-related syndromes and the treatment of long-term psychiatric disability after deployment (Pols & Oak, 2007).

In an effort to measure levels of cultural competence throughout private and government sectors, several institutes developed proprietary measurement tools. Initially, the impetus to develop such tools was borne from a need within the counseling psychology field that recognized the importance of working with clients within a culturally appropriate context.

**Cultural competence self-assessment questionnaire (CCSAQ).** One such institute is the Portland Research and Training Center that developed the CCSAQ (Mason, 1995). The
CCSAQ is based on the Child and Adolescent Service System Program (CASSP) Cultural Competence Model (Cross et al., 1989), which describes competency in terms of four dimensions: attitude, practice, policy, and structure (Mason, 1995). The tool is designed to assist family and child service agency employees to assess their cross-cultural strengths and weaknesses. Such an assessment permits the development of therapeutic interventions that promote cultural competency in the field.

Originally the CCSAQ was developed for use in child and adolescent mental health systems, but the measurement tool has since been applied to varied human service disciplines along the lines of alcohol and drug abuse treatment, maternal and child health, juvenile justice, child welfare, public health, and education (Mason, 1995). Organizations used the CCSAQ to assess cultural competence training needs in areas such as improvement of service delivery to culturally diverse populations, identification of existing organizational cross-cultural strengths, and the development of relevant training topics for service providers (Mason, 1995). The tool was originally intended to assist service providers who work with groups of color, yet its applicability to other groups is valid (Mason, 1995). The CCSAQ was not selected as the measurement tool of choice for the purposes of this study due to its bases in child behavior counseling, which did not prove to be a relevant match for the military community.

**Multicultural counseling inventory (MCI).** The MCI developed by Gargi Roysircar-Sofowsky, Professor and Director of the Multicultural Center at Antioch University New England, is yet another self-report instrument used to measure multicultural counseling competencies. It uses a survey of 40 self-reported statements rated on a 4-point Likert scale from very inaccurate (1) to very accurate (4) (Roysircar-Sofowsky, 1996). The author developed the MCI as a search for more dimensions than the three existing recognized dimensions
(multicultural counseling skills, multicultural awareness, multicultural and multicultural counseling knowledge) with the motive to achieve a more comprehensive self-assessment tool encompassing four dimensions; the fourth dimension being multicultural counseling relationships (Roysircar-Sofowsky, 1996).

**Cross cultural adaptability inventory (CCAI).** Another self-assessment tool to measure one’s level of cultural competence is the CCAI, which can facilitate the transition in to new or different surroundings. The CCAI was first published in 1992 and developed collaboratively by Colleen Kelley, a human relations consultant who specializes in cross-cultural training, and Judith Meyers, a psychologist who concentrates on assessment and diagnosis (Meyers, 2016). After an exhaustive search for an appropriate training tool yielded no results, they worked to create their own system. This system is used to promote multi-cultural discussions in training settings, prepare individuals for travel or study abroad, and to improve the counseling of individuals considering life changes involving other cultures (Meyers, 2016).

The CCAI facilitates the identification of an individual’s or group’s strengths and weaknesses in four skill areas that are fundamental to effective cross-cultural communication and interaction. These areas are Emotional Resilience, Flexibility/Openness, Perceptual Acuity, and Personal Autonomy (Meyers, 2016). The CCAI is based on a total of 653 male and female participants from varied cultures and occupational fields.

**Cultural Intelligence (CQ)**

This research employs the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) based on the principle of cultural intelligence (CQ). Cultural intelligence was chosen over the other alternatives due to its limited exposure in previous military research and the fact that as of December 2016 the CQS is based on a large database of over 58,000 participants representing 98 countries (Cultural
Intelligence Center, 2016). The researcher attended a CQ certification course in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and achieved certification in CQ Levels I and II, which allowed the researcher the ability to process results and to provide feedback and counseling to participants. These factors contributed to the final decision to use CQ as the primary tool to measure the sample groups.

Livermore (2015) provides a founding principle of cultural intelligence by proposing that culture is not a thing but rather a fluid concept with complicated moving parts that require an endless amount of effort to allow for success in any cross-cultural settings. Further, there are many concepts that suggest what best determines positive cross-cultural outcomes. The guiding theme throughout CQ is to assist individuals in self-awareness first, followed by the development of a working, cross-cultural interaction plan (Livermore, 2015). Cultural Intelligence starts where the client is, and involves a measurement tool to capture this beginning point, to gain an understanding of the participant’s current cross-cultural personal awareness level. More importantly, this is the stage that offers an opportunity to examine the individual’s potential for motivation, which is the key to CQ success and to any other cross-cultural education. Motivation is key, for without it no forward movement can begin. It is important to assess this in the beginning and if there is a lack of motivation it needs to be addressed, for until an individual’s lack of motivation is corrected, little can be accomplished in the realm of cross-cultural competency (Livermore, 2016).

The significance of the words “cultural intelligence” may present a distinct difference between how the originators of CQ, Earley and Ang (2003), understood it and how the military community interprets these words. The words cultural and intelligence alone contain a wide range of definitions and no matter whether used in the civilian or in the military community, both
words, independently used or strung together, clearly elicit different meanings. It is important that the reader understands the intended meaning of cultural intelligence (CQ) represented herein.

Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is directly linked to Earley’s and Ang’s (2003) development to define what forces drive cross-cultural interaction in the realm of the global community. At the end of the 20th century the majority of people working in cross-cultural environments were limited in number and mostly expatriates (Aizpourm, Ebrahimi, & Alipoor, 2013). As the 21st century emerged, the world faced burgeoning globalization and, for the first time, global citizens were exposed to or had the potential to engage in cross-cultural interactions from their living rooms. This globalization virtually opened the business community to a global market place, which had not previously been possible (Quelch & Klein, 1996).

The selection of CQ as a measurement tool in this research is due to its ability to utilize century-old research and adapt it to a practical realism that is useful in present business and military settings. Cultural Intelligence is a relatively new methodology used to identify areas critical for success in cross-cultural settings. Earley and Ang (2003) approached CQ by blending accepted models of proven assessment methods of an individual’s aptitude, and they asked what other possibilities existed to ensure cross-cultural success. Little work has been accomplished using CQ in the military. Further, the four defining areas outlined by Van Dyne et al. (2015) of strategy, knowledge, motivation, and behavior seemed to offer a logical correlation with the military and its training programs.

**Understanding cultural intelligence.** The concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is relatively new, but based on more than 100 years of empirical data. Cultural intelligence was introduced by Earley and Ang (2003), who approached the issue of how to better prepare
individual interactions in cross-culture settings. Others such as David Livermore (2015) have continued to expand and add to the research. The assumption behind the concept is that CQ can be measured on a scale in much the same way as IQ (Intelligence Quotient) and EQ (Emotional Intelligence). Simply put, CQ “refers to a person’s capacity to adapt to new cultural settings based on multiple facets, including cognitive, motivational, and behavioral features” (Earley, 2002, p. 271). Cultural intelligence is driven by the theme of assisting individuals in self-awareness, followed by the development of a working, cross-cultural interaction plan (Livermore, 2015).

An individual’s capacity for culturally effective behavior is first highlighted with an assessment of one’s level of motivation. Motivation is important and viewed as the key to successful outcomes in cross-cultural education, for without motivation, little can move forward, as pure cognitive factors do not guarantee success in CQ or other measurable quotations such as IQ. An individual with a high IQ may not perform well academically without the necessary level of motivation. By the same token, without motivation, it would be impossible for an individual to reach his or her potential in cross-cultural competency (Livermore, 2016).

As Earley and Ang (2003) argued, CQ is directly linked to the forces driving cross-cultural interaction within the global community. During most of the twentieth century, the number of people working in cross-cultural environments was limited to expatriates (Aizpourm, Ebrahimi, & Alipour, 2013). In the twenty-first century, the forces of globalization, which certainly had existed in the closing years of the previous century, became more powerful. For the first time, global citizenship was relevant and opened the business community to the global marketplace in a way that had not been possible previously (Quelch & Klein, 1996). Coupled
with the demands of a global war on terror, cultural intelligence has become necessary for survival and success in the twenty-first century.

**Background of cultural intelligence.** A century of research assumed that general intelligence (IQ) would be the leading and most relevant factor to function successfully in a cross-cultural environment. Since it was well known that a high IQ was an accurate predictor of academic success, a logical assumption would be that a high IQ would be a predictor of high emotional intelligence (EQ) and social intelligence (SQ) (Moon, 2010). General intelligence, emotional intelligence, and social intelligence were the assumed factors that would determine one’s ability to function in a cross-cultural environment (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). Simply put, an individual would prove more successful in a cross-cultural setting if he or she met the requirements of high general, emotional, and social intelligence than one who did not possess those same characteristics (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006).

Earley and Ang (2003) broke new ground by suggesting that CQ in itself was a form of intelligence and, more importantly, CQ provided a new approach to success in cross-cultural settings different from what had been previously identified. Their work added new research and concepts offered a new approach for the academic and research community to expand on previous beliefs that relied heavily on the traditional and accepted quotations.

For years, researchers at the Nanyang University in Singapore, led by Earley and Ang, had been searching for a modern approach that would address the difficult issues facing business leaders in cross-cultural settings. They focused on those qualities they knew prepared individuals for success in various cross-cultural environments and consequently generated a theory they believe applies in any cross-cultural situation (Earley & Ang, 2003). This research reshaped the conversation on cross-cultural success from being culture-specific, to a set of ideas
relevant to any cultural setting. Cross-cultural success is not the consequence of knowing how to operate in a specific culture, rather it is an individual’s perception of that culture and the use of a method to adapt and respond to specific situations in any culture that determine one’s success or failure (Livermore, 2015).

Earley and Ang’s (2003) initial work established CQ as a legitimate field of study in the social sciences, as experts continue to seek the appropriate way to approach the global, cross-cultural community that has emerged over the past twenty years (Livermore, 2010). Although some may argue that cultural intelligence is not a relevant concept for everyone, it is important to understand that CQ is not a fad or new idea, it is based on decades of accepted social science research.

**The specifics of cultural intelligence.** Cultural Intelligence is one of several currently understood aspects of human intelligence, including general intelligence (IQ), social intelligence (SQ), and emotional intelligence (EQ) and is conceptualized in four distinct levels of understanding (Earley & Ang, 2003). The four areas on which CQ focuses are based on metacognitive, cognitive, motivation, and behavior factors (Earley and Ang, 2003). Earley, Ang and Tan (2006) define these four areas as:

1. Metacognitive CQ reflects an individual’s personal cultural awareness and his or her ability to maintain that level of conscious understanding in cross-culture interactions (Earley et al., 2006). Individuals that are aware of their cross-culture environments make positive adjustments in their interactions with others (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008).

2. Cognitive CQ reflects an individual’s general knowledge of culture based on factors that have been learned from education and personal experiences (Ang &
Van Dyne, 2008), thus reflecting the extent of an individual’s understanding of the ways cultures are the same and the ways cultures differ. This includes other preconceived positive and negative concepts of culture.

3. Motivational CQ reflects an individual’s interest and confidence in creating a successful cross-culture interaction. Even someone who has a firm grasp of a specific culture may not perform well without motivation. (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008)

4. Behavioral CQ reflects an individual’s capacity to use appropriate verbal and nonverbal behavior in various cultural settings. Ang and Van Dyne (2008) describe this as one’s ability to control and adjust behavior to meet the culture needs of any given situation. (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008)

These four areas are critical to CQ and show how Earley and Ang’s (2003) ideas changed previous thinking about the sources of effectiveness in cross-cultural interactions. Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson (2006) agree that CQ dispels some of the previous arguments that placed more weight on traditional forms of intelligence and argue that previous interpretations may require adjustments based on Earley and Ang’s research. Their work suggests that motivation and behavior components are critical to success in navigating cross-culture seas.

**Individual success through cultural intelligence.** Many factors contribute to one’s success in cross-cultural environments, including the individual’s level of acceptance and a personal awareness of cross-cultural situations. Hernandez and Blazer (2006) suggest that an individual’s competency is demonstrated through attitude, view of the world, geographical location, and is influenced by parents, gender, race, and social-economic class. Lewis (2011)
argues that an individual relies on various cognitive factors that place a high value on an individual’s preconceived concepts of culture and regional norms.

To build on the previous statement, perception is many times a reality, and without education, motivation, and behavioral change, nothing will change that perception. Motivation and behavior modification are the foundation for effective cross-cultural performance. Consequently, Livermore (2015) argues against the idea that an introverted person would be less effective in cross-cultural interactions than would an extroverted person. Since motivation is a primary factor in such interactions, a motivated introvert would potentially be as successful as an extrovert in a cross-cultural environment (Livermore, 2011).

Research on cultural intelligence has demonstrated that effective cross-cultural interaction depends less on an individual’s knowledge and experience with a specific culture than on his or her perception of culture in general and on his or her method of adapting and responding to immediate situations, regardless of the specific culture involved (Livermore, 2015). Livermore (2015) goes on to stress the importance of high levels of individual motivation and the ability to adjust behavior as the key to success, rather than simply relying on past experiences or training.

The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS)

Given the importance of cultural intelligence as established by the research reviewed above, the challenge then was to address ways of improving an individual’s level of cross-cultural effectiveness. The logical starting point for such efforts would be to develop a method of measuring an individual’s current level of CQ. Such a method could also be used as a screening device to identify individuals with high potential for cross-cultural effectiveness. Consequently, this need led to the development of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS), a
twenty-item personal assessment tool based on the research on cultural intelligence (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). Using the CQS, the Cultural Intelligence Center, located in Holt, Minnesota, as of the conclusion of 2016 has collected results from over 58,000 individuals representing 98 countries, which are used to identify an individual’s CQ level (Livermore, 2015).

To be clear, the CQS does not provide an exact CQ score. Rather, it provides a ranking or percentage measured among the results of others who have completed the four measured areas of CQ: metacognition, cognition, motivation, and behavior. The development of the CQS proceeded through six phases that examined possibilities and variants perceived by the researchers (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). The six phases were scale development, generalizability across samples, generalizability across time, generalizability across countries, generalizability across methods, and discriminant and incremental validity. The studies conducted during each of these phases confirmed that the CQS was a legitimate method of measuring an individual’s capacity for intercultural interaction without previous understanding of the exact culture to which one is exposed (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008).

The CQS breaks down the four areas of metacognitive, cognitive, motivation, and behavior under four new headings that correlate with the same order previously mentioned: CQ drive, CQ knowledge, CQ action, and CQ strategy. The participants are rated on each question on a low, moderate, and high scale. A low rating places the respondent in the bottom 25 percent, moderate in the middle 50 percent, and high in the top 25 percent (Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016).

The CQS self-assessment provides a score and a detailed report that uncovers sub-categories within each of the four dimensions. The score may improve over time and is not fixed to the initial test results (Van Dyne et al., 2015). Most participants find it beneficial to read the
feedback report once and re-read it again in a few days to reflect on the feedback and process how information can be best utilized (Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016). The importance of the individual’s understanding of his or her personal values and norms is a valid first step in the journey toward improved cross-cultural interactions. With CQ education, there is great flexibility for improvement once the individual understands the process. Once accepted, the next steps allow for an individual to continue to a higher level of CQ.
Part II

Figure 5. Photo taken by U.S. Army Sergeant Scott J. Tant of a U.S. Army female soldier holding the hand of an Afghanistan young girl in April 2010, somewhere in Afghanistan.
The Role of Cross-Cultural Competency Role in the Military

This section will focus on the Department of Defense (DoD) general response to addressing cross-cultural competency, with detailed examination of smaller elite units such as the United States Marine Corps, confronted with a multitude of challenging missions that have a high potential for cross-cultural engagements. Additionally, an examination of the Special Operation Force community offers a unique way of understanding the face of front line cross-cultural interactions.

The concept of cross-cultural effectiveness is of great importance to the military, particularly to military leadership as it attempts to overcome numerous cross-cultural challenges. In recent years, cultural training has attempted to provide more control to the war fighter in the turbulent, multi-cultural arena in the hope of producing a more effective, culturally intelligent warrior on the battlefield (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008). This collaboration between military leadership and scholarly research continues to facilitate the warrior’s evolution and to identify a modern approach to cultural awareness (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008). This individual approach may allow the concept of cross-cultural competence to strengthen the military’s cultural competency training, with less focus on the more traditional individual warrior’s preparation.

Brawn -vs- Brains Approach

Understandably, the military has the natural tendency to focus more on the hardware of war than on the mental and intellectual capacities of its warriors, which often comes as an afterthought in the preparation for conflict (Gallus et al., 2014). The Department of Defense’s lack of preparedness in providing meaningful cultural understanding and training became
apparent with the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, a deficiency that became even more apparent as the focus shifted from that country to Iraq.

By 2003, with a growing concern for failed policy and operational procedures, the need to address the culture gap had become clear. As a response, the Department of Defense initiated a study directing each military department Combat Command (COCOM), to join the Defense Agency in a review of the current requirements for language professionals, interpreters, translators, crypto-linguists, interrogators, and area specialists; a review that was to include enlisted men and women, officers, and civilian personnel (DoD, 2005, p. 1). The study covered post 9/11 activities through August 31, 2004 and became known as the Defense Language Transformational Roadmap (DoD, 2005). The document, published in January 2005, made the following four assumptions:

What is clear is that conflicts against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages will increase, thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions, especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.

Changes in the international security environment and threats to U.S. national security have increased the range of potential conflict zones and have expanded the number of likely coalition partners with whom U.S. forces will work. Establishing a new “global footprint” for DoD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for culture and regional foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s force. For more than a decade, the world observed how adversaries use cross-cultural mistakes
in the media to leverage sympathetic elements of the population and political opposition to divide international coalitions (DoD, 2005, p.3).

While credit may be given to the DoD, the military, and the academic professionals who compiled the information on which the report is based, attention is drawn to the fact that DoD remains without a service-wide plan to assess service members’ cultural competencies. In fact, academic military scholars admit the use of a broad range of cross-cultural competency tools that are inconsistent with different branches of the Department of Defense (Gallus et al., 2014). Alarmingly, social scientists have commented that the lack of agreement on a single standardized tool to measure the cultural competency of service members, has had a wide range of consequences, from a failure to fully utilize highly functioning service members to the identification of those who pose a danger to their respective units (Gallus et al., 2014).

**The Human Terrain System Experiment: “Good Initiative, Bad Judgment”**

The Human Terrain System (HTS) was a program introduced into the United States Army to help commanders understand the cultural context (i.e., the “human terrain”) of the war on terror. Initially based on an article by McFate and Jackson (2005), the HTS was a bold approach to the growing need of military commanders and troops to understand the enemy and the culture in which they were operating, by introducing numerous academics from the social science field, most being PhD anthropologists. These scientists were eventually seen by their community as intelligence assets for the military, which caused this social-science-meets-military experiment to be viewed in an extremely negative context by the social science community (Evans, 2015).

The Human Terrain System began in 2007 with a pilot test that sent five HTS trained teams to Iraq and Afghanistan (McFate and Jackson, 2005). Initially the program was funded for
two years with a budget of twenty million dollars. From that modest beginning, at its height the program involved 31 teams and an annual budget of one hundred and fifty million dollars (McFate and Jackson, 2005). As the American involvement in Afghanistan gradually drew down, the program was accordingly reduced. By the end of 2014, no HTS trained teams remained in the country, which essentially ended the program (McFate and Jackson, 2005).

During a press conference several months before the program ended formally, the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, praised the initiative as a forward-thinking program that addressed the age-old battle of winning hearts and minds. Secretary McHugh went on to argue that the information the teams provided was what he referred to as “actionable and useful for decision-making” (Vanden Brook, 2015, para. 5).

During its eight years of existence, the HTS received considerable praise from military leadership and criticism from the social science community. David Rohde, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist reported in a 2007 article in the New York Times that officers in Afghanistan reported that the HTS teams had helped “them see the situation from an Afghan perspective and allowed them to cut back on combat operations” (Rohde, 2007, para. 12). While another commander simply stated, “Call it what you want, it works. . . . It works in helping you define the problems, not just the symptoms” (Rohde, 2007, para 15).

The major criticism however, came from the American Anthropological Association, which was concerned with the ethical dilemma that participation by social scientists provided the kind of assistance to the military that would alter the culture the anthropologists were studying—a major violation of the association’s code of ethics. Allegations were made that the information the scientists were providing the military was altering the very culture they were hired to advise
on (Evans, 2015). This was a violation of the code to do no harm to the culture in which one is working and it created an immediate ethical dilemma (Connable, 2009).

Numerous studies have been conducted on the HTS initiative and listed in detail the various problems encountered by the program. However, every study conducted on the program to date acknowledged that a majority of the commanders in the field were very positive about the work of the human terrain teams and were supportive of their efforts (Lamb, Orton, Davies & Pikulsky, 2013).

The Army’s Human Terrain System can be viewed as a grand experiment in cultural intelligence, but with its excessive cost and the drawdown from Afghanistan, the program was allowed to expire (Evans, 2015). Despite its mixed success, the Department of Defense (DoD) clearly understands the need for cross-culture competence assessment and training. As evidence of this understanding, Jessica Gallus and her colleagues published an extensive annotated bibliography in 2014. The abstract of this bibliography establishes the importance of cross-cultural understanding in today’s military.

Given the current operational context, research both inside and outside the DoD has increasingly focused its efforts on better understanding the factors that contribute to effective cross-cultural performance. Of interest is the role cross-cultural competence (3C) plays in servicemembers’ ability to navigate cultural environments, as well as the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities that military training should be targeting to improve performance-related outcomes. Over the past ten years, numerous studies and theoretical pieces have been developed that explore these issues as they relate to both military and general populations. This annotated bibliography represents an initial attempt to gather this collection of work into a single, comprehensive review to be used as a reference for those conducting research in this domain.
Annotations hail from several different disciplines, including military psychology, organizational psychology, anthropology, and sociology, and range in content from theoretical to empirical studies, efforts at model building and computer technologies for understanding, and various methods for teaching and assessing 3C (Gallus et al., 2014). Clearly, the military has come to understand that cross-cultural competency is a key factor in determining an individual’s readiness and fitness for deployment, as well the crucial need to identify at-risk service members with limited cultural understanding (Gallus et al., 2014).

The United States Marine Corps and Approach to Cross-Cultural Awareness

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been examined extensively in the research of cross-cultural competency. The Corps is a small, elite unit with a highly structured system that places great emphasis on self-awareness, discipline, and motivation. Moreover, the Marine Corps has fought in some of the most difficult areas in Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the same time it was tasked to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian missions around the globe and had consequently been thrust into varied cross-cultural environments (Holmes-Eber, 2014). Because the focus of this study is Special Forces, this review of the literature places emphasis on research directed at Marine operations.

The United States Marine Corps is a leader in understanding the need for an improved approach to cross-cultural interaction and has attempted to educate and prepare Marines for battle in modern irregular war fighting (Healey, 2008). The Marine Corps has placed considerable emphasis on cultural awareness operational readiness, evidenced by the establishment in 2006 of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). The CAOCL created a Program of Instruction (POI) to teach Marines the basics of effective cross-cultural performance (MacMillan, Walker, Clarke & Mark, 2013). However, per Healy (2012),
prior to the establishment of the CAOCL, the USMC’s approach to training was virtually nonexistent. As he states, “throughout the USMC’s 200-year history a blatant neglect to train Marines to be culturally aware was the status quo” (Healey, 2012, p. 11). This neglect highlights the critical need for cross-cultural training as the Corps faces the demands of a global war on terror.

A better-late-than-never response to the lack of cultural training was addressed by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). In 2008, the USMC published Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber’s book titled *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Application* that highlighted the need for Marines to incorporate culture and cultural differences in mission planning and identified five cultural dimensions for Marines to consider when planning missions:

**Dimension 1, the physical environment.** The way that a cultural group determines the use of the physical environment, including who has access to important physical resources (water, land, food, building materials, etc.) and how the culture views these resources (e.g., land is owned or free to everyone).

**Dimension 2, the economy.** The way that people in a culture obtain, produce, and distribute physical and symbolic goods (whether food, clothing, cars, or cowrie shells).

**Dimension 3, the social structure.** How people organize their political, economic, and social relationships, and the way this organization influences the distribution of positions, roles, status, and power within culture groups.

**Dimension 4, the political structure.** The political structures of a culture group and the unique forms of leadership within such structures (bands, acephalous societies, councils,
hereditary chiefdoms and tribal structures, electoral political systems, etc.). The distinction between formal, ideal political structures versus actual power structures.

**Dimension 5, beliefs and symbols.** The cultural beliefs that influence a person's worldview; and the rituals, symbols, and practices associated with a belief system. These include the role of local belief systems and religions in controlling and affecting behavior (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 25).

The researchers made observations similar to those made by Healy (2012) regarding the lack of cultural tolerance among the Corps; however, in the early days of the war on terror this deficit was not openly discussed or even seen as a negative. This denial is characteristic of an attitude commonly witnessed in combat areas, especially those of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and it remains a topic that is taboo even today (Shanker & Oppel Jr., 2014).

Despite the historical disregard for cultural issues, when compared to other branches of the U.S. military, the United States Marine Corps has participated in their own cultural awareness training through a concentrated approach and strong focused leadership that understands the importance of culture and its role on the modern battlefield. Despite the Corps’ efforts however, little attention has been paid to the cross-cultural awareness of the lowest echelon of enlisted men and women. Yet such awareness is crucially important, for it is these individuals, many of whom are in their late teens, who are required to make life and death decisions with minimal supervision, all while under the inconceivable stress the battlefield delivers (Kelly & Holmes-Eber, 2010).

Arguably the Marine’s enlisted personnel go without adequate training while junior officers receive CQ training at the Marine Corps University (MCU) at Quantico, Virginia. The training offers them tools to prepare for the unique demands of a cross-cultural combat
environment. If only one officer is charged with leading several junior Marines, an argument can be made that this type of training benefits all Marines (Kelly & Holmes-Eber, 2010), a dubious argument at best.

David Livermore (2015) defends the need for individual preparation and contends that cultural intelligence (CQ) provides the individual the ability to understand, through personal awareness, an essential step in the process of increasing one’s level of CQ. For without identifying individual values and norms, it would seem impossible to develop a solid strategy to gain success in a cross-cultural situation.

While there has been some effort toward addressing the importance of cultural understanding, many important issues remain insufficiently addressed by the U.S. Marine Corps. The military and the Marines may not know where the next armed conflict may take place. Although preparing every Marine for any given culture is arguably an impossible task and may be a valid concern, cultural intelligence training does address this concern, as CQ is not culturally specific. Cultural Intelligence ideally permits an individual to move more easily between cultures, although further research is needed to assess the full benefits of how CQ works for individuals in different cultures, particularly within the military (Rockstuhl et al., 2010).

The Marine Corps Expeditionary Design

The Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy and was officially established November 10, 1775. It is composed of three divisions of Marines: the 1st Division based at Camp Pendleton, California; the 2nd Division based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and the 3rd Division based on the island of Okinawa, Japan. These divisions are strategically located and show their amphibious heritage by holding beachfront property for training in all three locations. In peacetime two to three Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable
MEUSOC) are operational and consist of 2,200 sailors and Marines deployed aboard self-sufficient, amphibious ships known as the Gator Fleet. The ships are deployed around the world ready to direct their resources on objectives when ordered by the President or by Congress.

The MEUSOC can fight for fifteen days without additional support and can operate under four major tasks that coincide with the meaning of MEUSOC (Marine Corps, 1994). This provides the Commander in Chief a “Force in Readiness,” a term the Marine Corps adopted as America’s international 911 force.

- Amphibious assault, raid and withdraw (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006)
- Operations other than war that include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006, p. 3).

The Marine Corps' three-block war concept. The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, proposed that the Corps require the capability to fight a three-block war, which seemed appropriate at the end of the 20th century (Dorn & Varey, 2009, p. 38). The three-block concept is based on three situations the Marines may face within three blocks of any city in the same day or vis-à-vis a type of Black Hawk Down scenario. Dorn and Varey (2009) describe the concept as follows; in the first block, Marines may be ordered to assist in the distribution of food and aid to refugees in a humanitarian mission. The next block may find the Marines attempting to maintain peace between two warring factions. Lastly, the third block depicts the Marines fighting in a highly lethal, mid-to-high-intensity battle.

General Mattis and Hoffman (2005) built on the three-block war principle and subsequently considered the existence of a fourth element, the realization that human beings are
part of each block. This constitutes a significant factor in mission accomplishment; managing the human terrain element is crucial in any situation the three-block concept may provide. General Mattis understood cultural understanding as a meaningful part of the overall strategy for successful fighting in Iraq. He saw the Marines as the sensors as well as the transmitters in communication and intelligence gathering (Mattis & Hoffman, 2006). The concept of the fourth block has continued to evolve, along with other attempts to gain a cross-cultural advantage. Today, the fourth block element is better known throughout the Department of Defense as Cross-Cultural Competency (Gallus et al., 2014).

Prior to September 11, 2001, the final decades of the twentieth century bore witness to a transition from conventional warfare, known to Marine leadership as the Amphibious Doctrine, to more low intensity conflicts with scenarios such as those found in Granada, Panama, and Somalia. As the Corps transitioned to more precise, close contact scenarios involving foreign nationals, the potential increased for more exposure to cross-cultural situations. Consequently, training was required to meet these challenges, allowing the Marine Corps to increase its usefulness as the country’s niche fighting unit to not only the Department of Defense and the Commander in Chief but also to the United States Department of State (DOS). In this capacity, The Corps is considered as an extension of the DOS to spread its influence while shaping foreign policy by use of this “Force in Readiness.” Such uses range from combating terrorism, to international peacekeeping, to humanitarian assistance, and to training of foreign militaries (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006).

In the execution of foreign policy, the United States uses two basic strategies in its use of the military. First, the simple exhibition of power aims to prevent violence through an unmatched show of military force that causes the enemy to halt its posturing or to withdraw its
forces. If force is deemed necessary, a second approach uses coordinated attacks to neutralize the enemy swiftly, while limiting the mortality of allied forces and unarmed citizens. Such missions are generally achieved on foreign soil within a cultural terrain markedly dissimilar to that of the United States.

Historically, Marine Corps training has focused on providing its members with the world’s most technologically advanced military equipment and developing the most advanced training systems for the use of that equipment. Yet, while technology has evolved, training philosophies have fallen short, as is documented here (Healey, 2012). Specifically, questions arise as to whether current Marine training fails to prepare its fighters to navigate the cultural terrain of the battlefield and whether, as an organization, the Corps is interested in reducing injuries and deaths of its own forces, its allies, and the lives of non-combatants.

Military and academic institutions describe modern conflicts as involving “unconventional warfare,” “irregular warfare,” and “asymmetrical warfare,” terms used throughout this research. In short, most of the modern conflicts in which the USMC participates involve an enemy unlike any other encountered before. This enemy is one with far fewer resources and training than the Corps and may or may not be part of a proxy war sponsored by a nation-state. The enemy may engage in an urban operational environment and attempt to achieve victory not through the complete destruction of the opposing military’s forces, but through the age-old unconventional warfare concept of achieving victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support (Korb & Bergmann, 2008).

Over the past fourteen years, much of the USMC combat activity consisted of fighting a two-war campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. The efforts in Afghanistan continued through 2016 in nearly the same battlefield faced shortly after September 11, 2001. The enemy has proved to
be a worthy adversary to the extent that the Taliban has shockingly assumed a legitimate place at the political table, a feat that was unimaginable in 2001. Military leadership and scholars have concluded that to improve the military’s effectiveness, the Corps must better navigate the cultural terrain of the operational environments it faces (Eber-Holmes, 2014). Fittingly, the mission to create a culturally adroit warrior has become an inherent responsibility for military leadership (Hajjar, 2010).

Different types of cultural awareness training have always been a part of the military culture; however, cross-cultural competency is an area that failed to truly gain the attention of leadership prior to the military being turned into an accompanying force in Afghanistan and more noticeably in Iraq. Insurgency forced leadership to take notice of cross-cultural challenges facing the military. However, just being aware is not enough, especially in the situation the military leadership found itself as it was losing the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Livermore (2010) argues that simple cultural awareness is not sufficient to alter behavior and fails to determine one’s cross-cultural success.

**Implementing Cross-Cultural Competency in the Military**

The DoD has defined the Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other characteristics (KSAOs) necessary for cross-cultural success. First, a body of knowledge or information exists that an individual may already hold and or learn. Second, certain skills can be identified that may enhance individual performance in cross-cultural environments. Third, certain abilities are necessary to effectively engage in cross-cultural interactions. Finally, other characteristics that are important for cross-cultural success include, but are not limited to, personal background, language, religion, motivation, and world-view (Gallus et al., 2014). Other studies in Cultural
Intelligence (CQ) that closely follow these KSAOs may be used to assist DoD to establish a foundation for cross-cultural training.

**Areas for Concern with the Future of Cross-Cultural Competency**

Given the varied cultures and terrains faced by the military, a formula for success was needed that included more than hardware. This need has resulted in an increased awareness of the need for culturally sensitive, effective warriors. This competency can essentially be viewed as a means to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population. In addition, such competencies can offer a Special Operations Forces member the opportunity to not only act in his or her natural warrior capability but also in a scholarly or diplomatic manner (Spencer, 2010). Admittedly, this is not a natural skill set for most conventional or non-conventional military personnel.

While the Marine Corps and other military units expect its men and women to operate appropriately in non-combatant situations, the underlying, fundamental thinking of the military is simply to kill the enemy. A prime example may be viewed through the lens of the Marine Corps’ stated mission for an infantry rifle squad, which is to “locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat” (United States Marine Corps, 2015). Nonetheless, despite this inherently violent mission, there has been a growing understanding that in fighting a war, the modern warrior must demonstrate the attributes of cultural intelligence to be fully successful on today’s battlefields. More than ever, American troops are expected to provide the killing attributes of former warriors, while combining that skill with the ability to be diplomatic about it. Military experts Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, and Smith (2010) offer that,
Conducting military operations in low-intensity conflict areas without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is akin to building a house without using thumbs: although possible, it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure. Unfortunately, while such waste on a building site means merely loss of time and materials, waste on the battlefield means loss of life—both civilian and military—with high potential for failure having grave geopolitical consequences to the loser. (Spencer, 2010, Kindle location 909).

To further expand on the importance of addressing these concerns with a better plan is supported through the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, which states that,

Human reactions cannot be reduced to exact science, but there are certain principles that should guide our conduct. . . Psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of a country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may require a long period to re-establish confidence, respect, and order. (Spencer, 2010, Kindle location 909).

Spencer (2010) examines the ethical considerations of employing CQ and discusses it as a positive method for the military to prepare their nation’s men and women, who are sent into harm’s way, to act accordingly. “The meaning of war for many may appear silly or even barbaric in nature but it is no different from a schoolyard fight in its intent” (Location 1882). According to Spencer (2010), the intent is to get your enemy to submit to your will: “the enduring nature of war is that, within the strategic arena of conflict, we and our enemy are both striving to be able to destroy the other” (Location 1882). Unfortunately, both sides in any
conflict are almost certain to see their cause and themselves as righteous. Yet as the war on terrorism continues, the civilian population caught in the middle of that war see little righteousness on either side, as the continued war presents them nothing but evil conclusions (Spencer, 2010).

**Self and peer evaluations.** One of the areas discussed in the Department of Defense (DoD) annotated bibliography presented by Gallus et al. (2014), is the question of self-report measurement scales. Although the study was not directed at the CQS or CQ in general, concern was expressed for the accuracy of any self-rating survey. It is well known that the inclusion of peer testing enhances the overall usefulness of self-reports. While research has been conducted for over twelve years with assessment tools such as the CQS, Multicultural Personality Questionnaire (MPQ), the Interpersonal Development Inventory, and the Cross-Cultural Competence Assessment Tool (Gallus et al., 2014), concern exists that these assessments rely solely on the individual assessment through their own ratings, which will present bias, such as social bias, by the participant. Although the Gallus et al. (2014) report made clear the need for a balance of peer and individual surveys, it was not clear why the Gallus et al. (2014) DoD publication excluded the use of peer reviews.

**Better results through peer and self-assessment.** The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) should be considered a starting point in developing an individual’s level of cross-cultural competency. The need to perform peer- and self-assessments rests in the reality that self-assessments alone are usually not enough to develop a personal awareness strategy. There are proven examples where there is tendency for some of the worst performers to rate themselves higher in cross-cultural competency than is merited by their actions (Gallus et al., 2014). Through the researcher’s knowledge, there is one confirmed case of this in the research study.
Previous research provides evidence of this type of response with a military research study that discovered this discrepancy through the differences of United States military officers and their host Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) as cited in this literature review.

The study focused on several United States military officers stationed in Egypt who served as Security Assistance Officers (SAOs), whose mission was to interact in cross-cultural environments as direct representatives of the United States military and Department of State (Braziel, 2011). Based on their thorough training in the Arabic language and culture preparation, the SAOs thought they understood fully the host culture and believed they presented a positive example to their hosts. Unfortunately, their Egyptian FSN counterparts did not make these same observations. As the study concludes, the overwhelming amount of evidence . . . gave a strong indication that the FSNs perceived the SAOs as not fully possessing an adequate level of cross-cultural competency. . . . The FSNs were asked to provide their thoughts about the leadership capabilities of SAOs. Examples of the FSNs’ negative perceptions of the SAOs’ cross-cultural competency included statements such as “military leaders . . . do not have the whole picture,” “military members really do not know much about leading Egyptians,” and “most of them [the SAOs] were not properly taught about Egyptian culture,” and “disappointment” (Braziel, 2011, p. 160).

Braziel’s (2011) study was driven by the hypothesis that military service members would successfully use CQ due to the presumption that every military officer holds a reasonable amount of measured discipline and motivation as, presumably, they are motivated and in control of their behavior. While the research demonstrated that some of these key traits, such as self-motivation and drive did exist, they were not automatically a guarantee for success. Whereas the military personnel scored high in areas of self-management, confidence, and self-identity ratings, they
scored lower in areas related to tolerance of ambiguity. This included social flexibility, self-awareness, and emotional sensitivity, factors that do not align very well with the skill sets required for effective CQ (Braziel, 2011). Simply put, these highly trained and motivated officers did not, overall, prove themselves to be culturally intelligent.

What becomes clear from the literature on cultural intelligence and is agreed upon throughout the social science community is the importance of understanding the process of world globalization and the need to manage its evolution (Livermore, 2015). CQ research defines how humans may successfully interact in cross-cultural settings with little to no preparation for that specific culture (Livermore, 2015). Further, cultural intelligence (CQ) argues that anyone may be successful in a cultural setting with the appropriate training. As a business tool, the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) may be used to quickly define who will be most accomplished in an emerging arena where success is demanded (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). And while CQ is geared to the business community, there currently exists no data to indicate this business model should not be used within the military arena.

**Balancing cross-cultural competency with combat.** Dehumanization of the enemy is a fundamental method of preparing military service members for combat. To ensure success on the battlefield, the military requires its warriors to de-humanize the enemy, to see things clearly in a “you versus them” scenario—kill them or they will kill you. However, French (2005) argues that the reality of combat is rarely that black and white and that many difficult choices are made in deciding whom to kill. Arguably, there is much gray area involved on the battlefields of the Twenty-first Century and uncertainties that demand careful attention, which should be an integral component of cross-culturally sensitive warfare.
One major concern plaguing the military over the past decade as a by-product of multiple hostile deployments, especially concerning the Special Operations Commands, is prolonged exposure to a high state of stress without a mechanism for purging the combat mindset. This drains the servicemembers’ psyches and is argued to be a contributing factor too much negative behavior within the Special Operation Forces (SOF) community (Glicken-Turnley, 2011). An examination of how other cultures traditionally deal with a warrior’s return from combat and how the public regards these veterans and the striking difference between the attitudes characteristic of the war on terror (French, 2005). With a new report about the Navy’s elite commando unit that surfaced in early 2017, about members of SEAL Team VI involving a culture in which war crimes were not only tolerated but encouraged in some cases (Quinn & Zilber, 2017).

The members of Seal Team VI were facing multiple deployments, up to 17 back to back. Additionally, these men witnessed gruesome and frequent combat, including the beheading of one of their teammates in Afghanistan. This set into motion an untamed retaliation exercise by some SEAL team members (Quinn & Zilber, 2017). These high stress conditions, combined with leadership dismissing questionable and at times criminal offenses, created a setting that would evolve into encouraging rogue behavior. In what was referred to by some as war pornography, team members were introduced to bleed-out and death videos with the intention to place the men in a certain warrior mindset. Through videos, books, and drone footage, the mental preparation was set in motion for the described criminal war crime acts throughout Afghanistan and Iraq (Quinn & Zilber, 2017).

Quinn and Zilber (2017) record eye witness accounts of some of these accusations, which included practices of the mutilation of bodies, beheadings, killing of innocent non-combatants
and a practice referred to as canoeing, which is shooting people in the head, which causes a V shaped cavity in the head, exposing brain matter and leaving the face unrecognizable. The story reported that this is a calling card of SEAL Team VI, so that the enemy would know they were there and act as a deterrent to stop the enemy from fighting (Quinn & Zilber, 2017).

**Stress and eustress in the military.** The Department of Defense defines combat and operational stress as, “The expected and predictable emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or behavioral reactions of an individual who has been exposed to stressful events in war or stability operations,” (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 37). With this definition of stress, eustress, and combat stress comes into question the real-world application of stress and its triggered response in the human body, as it relates to one’s level of Cultural Intelligence. Generally, in stressful situations, one seeks to avoid such experiences in the form of a “fight or flight coping mechanism” (Ranabir & Reetu 2015, paragraph 1).

In military servicemembers, this could possibly manifest in an individual actively avoiding interactions with members of different cultures to avoid the stress reaction. Such members of different cultures may belong to the same culture as combatants who have killed an individual’s colleagues, engaged in firefights, or set off Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Conversely, and perhaps sadistically to a non-combat experienced civilian, there may exist service members who seek interactions with members of the same culture as for them the resulting eustress from defeating the enemy provides a form of pleasure. The challenge for many soldiers who rely on hyper-vigilant skills to stay alive in combat environments is the transition back to a civilian world where such intensity is not needed to function (Carey, 2016, para 8).

While this study does not include the scope to fully examine the question of the impact of stress on a Special Operations Forces’ member’s level of Cultural Intelligence, it does aim to
begin the discourse on the topic. There are many factors that combine to shape an individual’s outlook on life. In the case of Special Operations Force members, they are exposed to frequent, violent tours of duty and there are no other military units that are as exposed to multiple short-term, violent combat action tours as are the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) members (Terse 2011). It is unquestionable that exposure to such austere environments will take a toll on one’s mental and physical health. This may be an area that can be exploited with personal assessments such as the CQS. These types of assessments and counseling may assist DoD in better evaluating and determining whether multiple deployments are in the individual’s best interest, as well as the best interest the Special Operation Force (SOF) or the United States’ continued engagement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Research on combat operations shows that repeated deployments to hostile areas can include stressors that are unique to such missions. For example, veterans of Operation Desert Storm cite the threat of enemy fire, dealing with U.S. casualties, and handling human remains as significant sources of stress (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2016). Yet while some military peacekeeping personnel on deployments experience similar stressors, it is more likely to be on a reduced scale (Hosekm, Kavanagh, and Miller, 2016).

Work by Hoge et al. (2004) focused on deployments in Afghanistan and in Iraq and the stressors faced by service members in combat zones. Three to four months after returning from their deployments, personnel were given a survey in which it was found by the authors that 58 percent of Army personnel deployed to Afghanistan, 89 percent of Army personnel in Iraq, and 95 percent of Marine Corps members in Iraq had been attacked or ambushed during their deployment (Hoge, et al., 2004, p. 18). The study finds that, although combat experiences in Iraq and in Afghanistan are often grouped as one and the same, in fact they are vastly dissimilar.
Knowing someone who was killed, taking on hostile fire, and being ambushed were more common among those who deployed to Iraq (Hoge, et al. 2004, p. 16).

Although certain scenarios generate varied stress response patterns, there are also distinct differences in responses to the same situation among individuals. This propensity to display a stress response pattern across a variety of stress-inducing situations is referred to as “response stereotypy” (Lacey & Lacey 1958). In a study by Robison and Manacapilli (2014), the strategies by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army were discussed in the approach to selecting members using personality tests and one’s ability to manage stress. These findings indicate that the military is aware of and proactive about the impact of stress on an operator’s ability to function.

In another study by Agrigoroaei, et al. (2013), it was commonly found that individuals who displayed higher self-esteem generally exhibited lower cortisol responses to acute stressors and performed better overall. Presumably, members of the SOF community do hold higher self-esteem and should be better than the average human at managing one’s individual response to stress. However, what remains unclear is the toll, if any, that repeated exposure to high-threat environments has on one’s ability to continue to manage one’s responses.

The returning warrior culture. The need to start with the warrior prior to confronting battle through the use of cross-cultural training may prove worthy in the mental health of these warriors throughout and at the conclusion of their deployments. CQS may be a method utilized as a predictor of how these service members will reintegrate back into society. French (2005) describes other cultures’ views of its warriors as having a social contract in which the society fully understands what its warriors have endured.

Other cultures go as far as to accept and to prepare their warriors in understanding that religious sins have been committed, usually in the name of Church or State, such as in the case of
the Crusades. French (2005) discusses the need for a cleansing period in which warriors are slowly brought back to a calmer, less brutal community, one standing in stark contrast to their previously chaotic life. In the United States, however, while the media covers the high incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that plagues the Veterans Administration, little is done to address the problem of PTSD before it becomes an issue. The United States seems to lack a sophisticated understanding on how to deal with returning warriors (French, 2005).

This lack of attention to the difficult transition a warrior must make when leaving combat can be measured by the suicide rate among Special Forces members, which occurs at a higher rate than that of other conventional combat units. As other military units have seen a trend toward fewer recorded suicides, the SOF community is experiencing an increase (Shanker & Oppel Jr., 2014). This would suggest that there are higher levels of stress within that community that might have been reduced through greater cultural awareness.

**Cross-Cultural Competency in the Military: Successes and Failures**

As the literature cited above has shown, cross-cultural competency has become an area of increasing concern in the months and years that followed the events of September 11, 2001. That need has only increased in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, an invasion that ultimately led to the destabilization of the entire Middle East (Engle, 2016). Naturally, any new initiative in as complex an organization as the United States military, in an environment as chaotic as the war on terror, would meet with both successes and failures. The following case studies present examples of the success and failures of cross-cultural competency in the U.S. military.

**The case of Saddam Hussein.** One success, which led to one of the most newsworthy events for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and for the Iraqi people, was the capture of Saddam Hussein. While there are many anecdotal examples of the importance of cross-cultural
success in the military environment, one use of cross-cultural competency that has not been
widely understood involves the capture of Saddam Hussein (McFate, 2005). The capture of
Hussein was the result of one of the tactics used to elicit information in Iraq following the
invasion, which focused on the capture of HVTs (High Value Targets). These HVTs were
former Iraqi government members of the Ba’athist party or the Revolutionary Command Council
devotedly loyal to Saddam Hussein (Lawton, 2016).

The faces of these HVTs were published on a deck of playing cards given to U.S. military
members as a visual aid to identify the targets. According to Navy Lt. Cmdr. Jim Brooks, a
spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Agency, this tactic was first used during the Civil War
and again during World War II (Sample, 2003). Saddam Hussein, the highest value target of
them all, was of course the Ace of Spades. It was believed that the capture and subsequent
interrogation of high-ranking officials would provide clues about Hussein’s location (Lawton,
2016). Up to this point, the pursuit of Saddam was viewed through a single lens that focused
exclusively on capturing and interrogating HTVs, a focus that allowed him to elude capture
(Lawton, 2016).

That was until a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) interrogator, Staff Sergeant Eric
Maddox, and an intelligence officer, Major Brian Reed from 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th
Infantry Division, decided to change the approach based on their cultural knowledge of the Arab
tribal system (Lawton, 2016). Their focus began to shift away from the pursuit of HVTs to
uncovering information about Saddam’s tribal connections, which mainly included people
outside of the government network. Maddox and Reed applied a strategy that began to identify
his secondary, familial, and tribal relationships (Lawton, 2016).
This focus on Saddam’s informal network led to a major break when, on December 1, Saddam’s former driver divulged the name of Muhammad Ibrahim, Saddam’s right-hand man and a leader of the insurgency (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013). This piece of information was used to piece together Ibrahim’s own kin network, leading to the interrogation of more than 40 members of his extended family. This painstaking investigation of informal networks and family relationships eventually led to the capture of Hussein in 2003 (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013). Essentially, Maddox and Reed used their cultural knowledge of the importance of Arab tribal clans to trace Saddam Hussein back to his roots in his ancestral village of Tikrit (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013).

The case of burning the Quran. On February 22, 2012, U.S. servicemembers at the United States’ Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, which at the time housed hundreds of captured Taliban and al Qaeda militants, began the process of burning some 2,000 books. This included Qurans and other religious texts, which had been confiscated from the prisoners’ library; these texts had apparently been used by them to send messages and were assumed to plot escape attempts. Although warned by an Afghan interpreter not to burn religious texts, soldiers nevertheless began the process by taking about 100 books to the base’s burn pit (Miklaszewski and Courtney, 2012). Although Afghan laborers helping with the disposal stopped the burning when they realized the nature of the texts, at least four Qurans had been badly burned (Bumiller, 2012).

Protests and riots subsequent to this event claimed the lives of at least two dozen people, including four members of the United States forces (Harooni, 2012).

The case of the dead Taliban fighter. The following failure of cultural understanding demonstrates how high the stakes are in the cultural battlefield and how a lack of cross-cultural
competency could shape the behavior of service members. This story reflects more on a
dehumanizing culture of American youth and their transition to becoming warriors thrust into a
war, which for most of the young service members were only three to five years old at the time
of the 9/11 attacks. They grew up in a culture that only knew Taliban and Al Qaeda as evildoers.
So this story is more about a culture that bred these men for their actions, not a lack of cross-
cultural understanding, although there is merit for that as well.

The unfortunate incident that sparked international condemnation involved a video of
four Marines urinating on the body of a dead Taliban fighter. Sebastian Junger (2012), a
respected journalist and expert in war correspondence, argues that to the Marines, this event was
not a big deal. They certainly had no expectation that the picture would make it to the
these men were preconditioned prior to entering the Marine Corps. Although damaging to the
image of the United States, Collation Forces, and the Marine Corps, their actions were
predictable when consideration of dehumanization of the enemy is in the mix. Junger (2012)
offers that,

It is difficult not to understand what led these four Marines to carry out this act.

In the reality of war and the preconditioning as they grew up in a post 9/11 society
these men justified their actions at the time with the question, what was the
difference between water boarding a live prisoner or urinating on a dead prisoner?

After all the government authorized them to shoot and kill this man with high
power rifles. (para. 12)

Junger (2012) goes on to argue that society is to blame and that there is a certain realism
of irony if the concept of war and the role society plays in the dehumanization of the enemy is
taken into consideration. Young men and women are asked to kill the enemy all the while remaining responsibly mindful of the human aspect of combat without the proper preparation for the task at hand. As a solution to this situation, an effort to increase the level of one’s cultural intelligence, or other efforts to increase other self-awareness concepts, could benefit warriors through a deeper understanding of the actions and consequences of the human terrain with which they are confronted.

**The SOF Operator: A New Warrior-Diplomat**

If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself you will be imperiled and lose every single battle.

—Sun Tzu

The SOF community has recently been anointed into a new heading as the future offers increased challenges and increased budgets with expansion of the SOF community. Turnley (2010) argues for the necessity of the SOF warrior today and in the future and describes how the traditional direct action missions connect with cross-cultural competence. It is and will continue to be a controlled balance for warriors and will transform them into becoming warrior-diplomats.

The title “warrior-diplomats” offers a new era of progress and one that defends the need for increased cross-cultural training (Turnley, 2010). The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) strategic plan starts with its focus on the individual SOF member, referred to as an “operator.” The first area of acknowledgement is that “the Operator needs to be prepared to excel across the myriad of defense, diplomatic, and development activities . . . while maintaining an unparalleled capability to employ direct action when necessary” (Turnley, 2010,
This means that a member of the SOF community must now be able to shift focus from warrior-based missions to one uncharacteristic of most of these elite units.

Today and the future have presented a direction forward for all Special Operation Force units. The need for these small cohesive forces to lead the way in the future of warfare combines expert skillsets with diplomatic necessities. Special Operations Forces are commonly ordered to move behind enemy lines to work in a restricted area while gathering intelligence, conducting raids, or engaging in other highly sensitive missions, as was certainly the case with Operation Red Wing, the SEAL Team Six mission that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan (Schmidle, 2011). With the evolution of modern battlefields, traditional warriors have been forced to undergo change. While change is difficult in any organization, for the SOF community the transition to warrior-diplomat status demands new methodologies to combat the enemy. This also requires a revised selection method and training for new members, as most SOF units rely heavily on elevated mental and physical stamina to overcome the pain their members endure in training and on the battlefield (Glicken-Turnley, 2011).

Although some traditional SOF missions remain, there are situations in which the Forces are expected to interact with people of diverse cultures, such as in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The new diplomacy requirements, combined with a high stress environment and the bravado traditionally associated with SOF units, can lead to diminished levels of cultural performance. These Special Forces face some of the highest redeployment rates in the military and a goal of this research is to gain an understanding of the resulting outcomes (Shanker & Oppel, 2014).

**Special Operation Force Members—a Unique Asset**

The SOF members are recognized as more mature and extremely highly trained (Bucci, 2015) and they tend to fall under guidelines characteristic of a certain lifestyle. They are married
with children, are between the ages of 29 and 34 years old, and have a minimum of eight years active duty status in a conventional unit (Bucci, 2015). They further stand out by their professional development as many SOF members, especially SF members, boast some foreign language skills and all commonly possess higher education to include multiple degrees, even at the enlisted levels. To wit, they have survived a highly stressful and difficult selection process to undergo further training courses and they have been introduced to cross-cultural training in both theory and in practical experience. All the while, they maintain the ability to operate and to teach their skills in a cross-cultural environment (Bucci, 2015).

Unfortunately for military leadership, the mystery of what determines a solid SOF warrior has yet to be answered, as there is not a formula that decides who makes it and who fails. Certainly, there are some researchers who argue a strong personality plays a key role and that athletic ability is necessary; yet, to debunk that thought, the military is full of Type-A personalities and athletes. That being understood, every year many top performers try and subsequently fail to join the SOF ranks with attrition rates ranging as high as 90 percent in some of the most elite units and a more normal range of 65 to 80 percent as seen in a review of Naval Special Warfare Command, Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUDs) (2006).

It becomes evident that most Special Operation Force (SOF) warriors are able to process problems differently and more effectively, especially under stress. Their critical and independent thinking skills, combined with high levels of imagination and initiative, provide them the unique ability to operate with little to no support, while leaving little to no sign they were ever there. While perhaps not the final determination of who makes an SF warrior, the SOF community’s higher levels of personal awareness, unmatched drive, and other contributing factors have proved
a successful model for small unit success in not only the military community but also within the public and private sectors (Spearin, 2007).

It should be noted that this literature review examined the understudied area of cultural intelligence in the military. A primary objective of the research is to determine whether CQ, through the use of the CQS, is an effective tool for measurement for the military in general and, more specifically, for the military’s Special Operation Forces (SOF). This research was conducted on individual former members of the United States Marine Corps Special Operations Units: The Raiders and Force Reconnaissance Companies. In addition, the data collected by this study can be used to further investigate whether multiple combat tours are productive or counter-productive regarding cultural interactions in combat environments.

**The selection process.** The beginning of an SOF career is strictly on a volunteer basis. For the most part, admittance to any Special Operations unit requires years of service in the designated branch. Basic training, specialty school, and time in one’s job usually is a prerequisite; however, some branches have streamlined the process. Yet, it is the standard that, at a minimum, the servicemember must have completed basic training and a specialty school. Once deciding to make the commitment, successfully passing the indoctrination phase and every other school that is required of an SOF unit, it will take many years of training before a new SOF member is fully qualified. The first step is the selection screening process, which is somewhat unique for each branch of the service.

Senior and experienced SOF operators observe candidates to identify wanted and unwanted character traits that become obvious in high-stress training. These include critical thinking and problem solving, internal fortitude, following orders, physical strength, and endurance, which have proven important for success in the past. Other desired traits include, but
are not limited to, the ability to work as a member of a team while at the same time being able to maintain independence and critical thinking. Depending on the branch of the service, the basic screening processes may last weeks, although the exact process is kept secret to challenge the participants and not allow them to prepare fully for the assessment. Over the years, individual units have utilized external academic assistance to assess what makes certain men quit, while others succeed. There remains no sure method to formulate who will make it through the training. Certainly, some men may have a physical advantage over others, but this has not guaranteed success. Additionally, some SOF units blend in cross-cultural assessments and training into their programs.

The SOF community seeks rare individuals with above average attributes to add to the team dynamics, including but not limited to general intelligence (IQ), emotional intelligence (EQ), social intelligence (SQ), and high levels of motivation. Since SOF members are painstakingly screened prior to joining their units and continuously assessed throughout their careers, it can be assumed that by the mere membership in their community each holds specialized traits, such as asymmetrical thinking, intelligence, drive, motivation and self-control. Some SOF warriors are trained specifically in cross-cultural interaction. And, although the Army Special Forces members are only a fraction of the entire SOF community, they necessitate special recognition within the study. While the remaining joint service members who contribute to the SOF community may not have equal, in-depth cross-cultural training to the level that the Army SF members do, they share a common asymmetrical approach to their work.

Special Forces members can be expected to possess high levels of motivation and self-control; the very attributes that research has shown predict a high ranking on the CQS. In
addition, David Livermore has shown the connection between motivation, self-control, and formal higher education and high levels of cross-cultural effectiveness (Livermore, 2011).

Research has been completed on foreign military SOF members. Dr. Emily Spencer (2010), for example, conducted research on Canadian Special Operations Forces, which provides rare observations by outsiders into Special Operations. This form of research is essential to understand SOF units and cultural intelligence. Spencer’s (2010) discussion of CQ adds an international contribution to the discussion about the benefits of using CQ in the military. It is understood that any military unit working in a foreign culture benefits from an understanding of not only their enemy but also of the civilians who live within the boundaries of the chaos of war.

War may be described as a cultural quagmire that weighs heavily on military units in which the additional layer of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is a force multiplier. Given that a culture is based on a system of common beliefs and values, if a unit can tap in to such preset concepts no matter how different they are from the unit’s culture, that increases the success rate and hence the addition of CQ as a force multiplier (Spencer, 2010, Chapter 4).

The U.S. military viewed the issue of culture awareness with great regard and understood the need to become better participants as students of CQ. And, while the military has identified this area, it has failed to institutionalize fully the concept throughout the ranks (MacMillan, Walker, Clarke & Mark, 2013). In the context of this study, the Special Operations community makes for a logical population to select, as the men are asymmetrical warriors faced with difficult conditions who must rely on training and on intelligence to make split second decisions in austere environments. To that end, a Special Operations team member spends years acquiring the skills to join an operational team and has been evaluated continually since arrival at their respective units (Glicken-Turnley, 2011).
Conclusion

The administration of sample CQS surveys throughout a military member’s career could offer a glimpse as to what alters one’s perceptions on CQ. The literature review, combined with the research in this study, enhances the overall picture of cross-cultural competency (3C), as it examines key factors to be assessed through the demographic survey and through personal interviews. The CQS alone does not reveal the fabric of what causes warriors to shape their cross-cultural views, but it does offer a personal assessment that allows for self-improvement. The personal assessment, combined with personal interviews and CQ counseling, may offer a better overall alignment for future military success.

Arguably, this is precisely where the CQ business model may fail to provide enough of an in-depth look to why the results are what they are. Further, the study explores merging cultural Intelligence CQ as a tool to enhance the military’s Cross-Cultural Competency 3C program. Cross-cultural training and the military are topics well represented in literature; however, what becomes apparent in the literature review is the dearth of general information connecting CQ and the military. This is likely because CQ has concentrated on the business sector; although it does include military members within its database, the database is a wide selection of more than 58,000 military, senior and junior executives, government and non-government organizations, students, and other business sector members that as of December 2016 represent 98 countries (Livermore, 2016).

Although CQ is relatively new, its use has been proclaimed successful by the Cultural Intelligence Center and many other academic professionals in the social science field. Yet U.S. military leadership has demonstrated little room to intertwine anthropology and sociology into training its warriors. In fact, the military’s rush to better understand how to control the human
terrain of the battlefield resulted in hastily planned efforts to manage cross-cultural environments. Such a focus on the overall situation led to a lack of attention on the importance of measuring the individual. And, due to the hierarchical, holistic approach the military necessitates, it is understandable how the needs of an individual have been overlooked.

As of 2016, the Department of Defense invested over a billion dollars to resolve a method to best ensure service members are prepared for cross-cultural environments (DoD, 2005). Leadership in search of hasty solutions to the challenges that new conflicts presented developed programs that, in review, never had a serious chance of success. Understanding the cultural gaps within the military necessitates an examination of previous areas where the military exhibited a lack of understanding in how to manage cultural programs (Holmes-Eber, 2014).

One example involves the deployment of U.S. military Korean linguists to Iraq, a blatant underutilization of manpower. In fact, it is believed that “a rate of underutilization hovering around 26% according to 2005–2006 placement” exists among graduated USMC Foreign Affair Officers FAO’s (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p. 171). Imagine a pilot who trains for more than two years exclusively as a pilot, but when he leaves school has a 26% chance of flying (Holmes-Eber, 2014). This is a prime example of underutilization of manpower, not to mention an example of a true motivation killer (Holmes-Eber, 2014).

The question remains as to what approach is best to enhance cross-cultural encounters. Cross-Cultural Competency (3C) would be considered a softer skill set, and, although its place in combat is critical, it is often overshadowed by technology until the human terrain becomes a problem for the leadership, such as the growing insurgency witnessed in Iraq (Hubert, 2014). Frequently, it is not until the military begins to lose control of the cultural battlefield that it seeks a deeper appreciation of the enemy’s culture (Herbert, 2014).
The Department of Defense has dabbled in welcoming outside assistance in a better-late-than-never approach to understanding culture to influence how a war is fought (Connable, 2009). What is unilaterally agreed on is the need for 3C and its legitimate place at the table; however, what remains unanswered is how to implement a service-wide system that meets these challenges (Gallus et al., 2014). Yet, after nearly fifteen years of fighting an irregular war in Afghanistan and again in Iraq, there remains no clear plan for training in cross-cultural communication.

This literature review demonstrates the existing challenges facing the initial research over the past decade, the continued examination over the pending questions and arguments, the subsequent development in the pursuit of similarities and differences among varied cultures, and different work organizations that involve CQ. Recognizing these dimensions as the foundation of the dissertation allows for questions and for future research to add to the existing literature for others to follow.
CHAPTER 3

Methodology

In an effort to further explore the area of cross-cultural competency through the lens of cultural intelligence (CQ) within the military, in particular the Special Operation Force community, this study examines the current approach to cross-cultural competency by conducting a comprehensive study. The research followed a sequential mixed method design that combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques through three online surveys guided by Creswell’s (2013) description of research requirements. The quantitative phase consists of two surveys. The first is a demographic survey administered online via SurveyMonkey and is composed of 20 questions (Appendix C). It was used to determine a participant’s eligibility and assignment to one of the two groups. Group A, which consists of former SOF, MEUSOC, and MARSOC units and Group B, consisting of former Army Special Forces “Green Beret” members.

The second survey is the backbone of the research as it establishes the baseline of the sample participants’ capacity for cross-cultural understanding. This is accomplished through the concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ), which is accompanied by a tool that gathers detailed information on personal CQ vis-à-vis the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) (Van Dyne et al., 2015). The CQS is widely accepted by numerous organizations, including the military, as a tool that provides a snapshot of an individual’s personal awareness as it relates to cross-cultural awareness (Livermore 2016).

The CQS provides a percentile score that is measured against a database of over 58,000 participants representing 98 countries as of December 2016 (Cultural Intelligence Center 2016). These data are used to compare Group A to Group B by providing an individual and group score
in relationship to the database. Further, the CQS provides the answers to the first two research questions. The CQS survey is presented through an online direct link to the Cultural Intelligence Center and consists of a twenty-question multiple choice questionnaire, divided into the four areas of Cultural Intelligence: CQ Drive, CQ Knowledge, CQ Action, and CQ Strategy, which are further broken into sub-categories (Appendix E).

The third and final survey represents the qualitative portion of the study and allowed the sample participants to provide multiple choice answers, and to add detailed responses to those questions (Appendix F). There are eight opportunities for the participants to add comments to their answers and provide detailed insight into why and how they chose their answers. This approach offered an opportunity to gain invaluable insight to the reasoning and methodology of each participant’s answers. Through the use of these three surveys, the researcher used a mixed method research that was designed to explore and expand on answering the following research questions and hypotheses.

The research intends to add to and enhance previous research with Cross-Cultural Competency (3C) within the DoD. Creswell (2013) discusses the idea that research should provide information intended to enhance an existing body of knowledge. The DoD is a multi-dimensional entity that is composed of internal cultures and subcultures. This research examines the DoD though the lens of a specifically targeted sample group of all male former Special Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members.

**Research Question 1**

How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?
H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships with their mission, enabling them to take on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating within a different cultural setting.

H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships of their missions causing them to take on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating within a different cultural setting.

Research Question 2

How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98 countries and more than 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?

H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Cultural Intelligence Centers Database.

H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the Cultural Intelligence Center database.

Research Question 3

How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute and correlate with the CQS survey?

H3o. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlation patterns between the sample groups and the CQ database.

H3a. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover correlation patterns between the sample groups and the CQ database.
Setting

The researcher’s physical location in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the time of the study led the researcher to rely heavily on social media and previous personal connections between the researcher and the sample population. Further, as a former Force Reconnaissance Marine, the researcher was able to solicit participants from the entire SOF and MEUSOC community and attain a certain engagement from the community without direct relationships with the participants. The study was conducted utilizing online surveys, and communication with the participants was via email.

Participants

The target population consists of former military service members divided into two groups. Group A contains 25 Special Operation Force (SOF), Marine Special Operations Command, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members representing a mixture of all branches of the services. Of the Group A sample group, the majority was from the United States Marine Corps Special Operation Command MARSOC, and other Special Operations Marines (Force Reconnaissance and Division Reconnaissance elements). The other SOF participants in Group A include personnel from Navy Sea Air and Land (SEALs), Special Warfare Combat Craft or Special Boat Team (SWCC/SBU), Army Rangers, and Air Force Para Rescue (PJs).

Group B consists solely of 10 former U.S. Army Green Berets, better known within the SOF community as Special Forces (SF), a highly unique group of individuals whose mission demands the same core insertion skills as other SOF units (Airborne Static-line and Military Freefall, Combat diving, and individual specialty development courses). However, after the core
skills are completed, the SF members pursue tracks of professional development different from that of their Group A counterparts.

As previously mentioned in the literature review, the SF members’ main mission is to work with indigenous people by developing cultural understanding and building bonds of trust that can withstand the worst conditions that combat operations produce.

The members of the sample groups were selected based on affiliation with the specific identified units, which were selected due to the hypotheses that the SOF, MARSOC, and MEUSOC population has a greater probability of increased exposure to cross-cultural experiences during their military service.

The former SOF and MEUSOC members represent a sample group, which is tasked with decision-making and operational tempo in multiple cross-cultural training and combat operations. Due to privacy concerns and strict Internal Review Board conditions regarding the involvement of active duty military members, the decision was made to recruit a sample group of former military service members, access to which is not so constrained. The sample group provides a broad swath of individuals, with many still working within SOF parameters as civilians. Additionally, some of the sample group are or have been continuously exposed to cross-cultural environments after separation from the military.
Using a quantitative and qualitative mixed method design for the study necessitated a linear approach to better manage the process. Such an approach allows the research to ensure that accurate sample group placement is accomplished and that individuals who do not meet the research criteria are removed from the study before proceeding to the next step. The demographic survey ensured that the sample participants met the parameters of being former SOF or MEUSOC members so they could be placed in the respective group. Creswell (2013) refers to this type of linear progress as an explanatory sequential design.

The quantitative phase lays the foundation through two online surveys. First, a demographic survey that assigned members to groups while disqualifying respondents who failed to meet research criteria. Second, once these groups were selected, the Cultural Intelligence Scale personal assessment survey was administered to both groups.

All quantitative and qualitative surveys were granted a seven-day completion schedule; however, provisions were made to accommodate special cases due to participant travel or
deployment outside the United States and emergency medical situations. Study participants were recruited through social media postings and direct connections to the researcher (Appendix B). The researcher solicited assistance by posting a request online for private Special Operations groups. Such sites are small and well-vetted by the groups. To become a member of a group, proof is required through a known referral that can vouch for a person’s identity and participation in SOF and MEUSOC. Both social media and word of mouth provided ample snowball sampling.

The importance of the CQS to the quantitative data cannot be understated, as the results from the instrument provide measureable scores that directly address the first two research questions. The third and final survey, an open-ended qualitative survey, was utilized to provide personal insight into the participants’ cross-cultural training, understanding, personal awareness and, most importantly, personal experiences with success and failure. Survey Monkey and Nivio qualitative software analysis tools, combined with manual review and summative approach to the qualitative data, provided the opportunity to examine common trends, concerns, and validation, and identify areas for improvement within the current DoD training system.

The analysis was initiated by identifying and subsequently quantifying words and phrases used in the open-ended questions by respondents, so that further clarifications could be made about the context of these words and statements. Open-ended questions in the online surveys were used as probes to gather more information regarding prior answers chosen. The words and themes presented were essentially coded and subsequently quantified based on consensus by three independent coders as in figure 5.
A summative approach to qualitative content analysis was chosen to further elucidate trends in the data and participant thought processes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The summative approach allows the researcher to move past the word key counts in the qualitative analysis and examine alternate terms and phrases (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach opened more opportunity to expand concepts from the small sample population, providing more depth of information to be extracted from the open-ended survey through “euhemistic versus explicit.” This allowed more variables to be added to the research and enhanced the overall mixed-method design (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285).
Analysis Discussion

Upon completion, the surveys were aligned with the corresponding individual to ensure they were correctly matched to their occupational specialty group. Once confirmed, participants’ names and email addresses were removed from the research, now identified only as a member of Group A or of Group B. The quantitative data was transferred to International Business Machines (IBM) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Additional data collected from the participants included age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, position in the military, number of deployments (if any), education, perception of cross-cultural relationships, and direct combat experience, which will be further examined in Chapter 4.

The qualitative survey design allowed for short but descriptive responses, a technique based on Creswell’s (2013) suggestion that using shorter, opened-ended questions allows for a more efficient coding of the responses. A mixed method design allows the researcher to gain invaluable information from the quantitative phase, which provides tangible statistics, while using qualitative research to complete the research design.

Based on more than twelve years of service as a United States Marine, the researcher had intimate knowledge of the sample population and, in turn, was easily accepted by and allowed access to that sample population. The researcher’s service ranged from the infantry to Special Operations and included attendance at several Army and Navy Special Operations schools, all of which contributed to unfettered access to this fraternity. Creswell (2013) suggests that there is no better method for understanding a group than to be a part of that group. In the past, scholars have pointed to the difficulties a researcher faces in mixing with certain groups. For example, such distinct populations as the homeless and prisoners are difficult for outsiders to penetrate and gain acceptance from the group due to a lack of assimilation with those individuals (Creswell
This further supports the researcher’s position that the connection to the sample group provides an outstanding advantage in conducting this research by collectively approaching the research through a detailed knowledge of the target population.

**Participants’ Rights**

Protection of the privacy of these participants is critical, as many deserve special consideration due to their previous positions and activities within the SOF and MEUSOC community. Additionally, many of the sample group remain actively employed in hostile areas where anonymity is still required. For these reasons, precautions have been taken to protect the identities of participants, while adhering to the strict guidelines covered by the Internal Review Board (IRB) at the University of New England. Signed consent forms were retained by each participant, with copies forwarded to the researcher for record (Appendix C).

**Ethical Considerations**

One of the primary ethical considerations is the researcher’s relationship with many of the members of the target population. The researcher has close ties within the SOF and MEUSOC community and recognizes the realistic issue that bias is possible on the part of both researcher and participant. Given the researcher’s experience as a Force Reconnaissance Marine with several deployments to hostile areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan as an active duty Marine and as a U.S. Government contractor, biases are almost inevitable but manageable with this understanding and knowledge.

Because of the researcher’s background, an opportunity exists in the research for professional bias in examining the qualitative survey. However, the researcher believes at this time that the benefits of his association with the SOF and MEUSOC communities outweigh any possible negative consequences. Some precautions were taken in analyzing the qualitative data,
although it is important to note that the traditional interviewer/interviewee relationship associated with open-ended qualitative study was not present in this study. This was due to the fact that the participant answers were acquired through an online survey with no face-to-face meeting.

The largest potential of researcher bias was in the analyses of the responses; therefore, steps were required to reduce such bias. To manage this bias, the use of a reflexive journal by the researcher supported efforts to identify and control bias throughout the analysis of the responses. Furthermore, a triangulation method was applied in the qualitative study as a means to ensure a rich and credible qualitative study was completed.

Finally, the researcher’s background offers a unique perspective that enriches the study and is far better suited to researching this unique community than that of an outsider. The understanding of the project dynamics and the pure quantitative data produced by the research offers the most effective safeguard for objectivity throughout the process.

**Potential Limitations**

This study is limited to a select group of former SOF and MEUSOC military servicemembers who, due to specialized training, deployment schedules, and exposure to cross-culture environments, should not be considered a direct representation of the entire armed services. Additionally, a notable area the quantitative data do not provide is each individual’s understanding of culture prior to joining the military. Bias from the researcher and the respondent are real concerns for a research study. Some of these concerns are taken from *Experimental Research*, (2016), which outlines bias that needs to be understood and addressed.
Participant Bias

The data relies on the survey participants’ willingness to participate and to give the surveys serious attention. This is especially true with the CQS and the open-ended surveys, both of which require thoughtful and honest self-evaluation and consideration by the participant.

Social and acquaintance bias. The CQS is additionally vulnerable to social desirability and acquaintance bias, since the participant may answer in a manner they believe society or the researcher would want them to answer. One method to combat this bias is to conduct peer evaluations in conjunction with the personal assessment survey. However, in this study, due to the difficulty in utilizing active duty service members which required IRB approval from the University of New England as well as from the Marine Corps University, the answers may not accurately reflect all members’ level of cultural awareness, motivation, or behavior.

This understanding restricted the researcher in sample group selection. Additionally, with the loss of a cohesive sample group such as an active duty platoon, the use of both self and peer CQS surveys was no longer viable and the loss of the peer evaluation created certain limitations in the study. As a consequence, the self-evaluation alone allows room for bias; therefore responses may not accurately reflect one’s true level of cultural awareness, motivation, or behavior.

Researcher Bias

There are additional concerns about the researcher role in the study regarding how the data are managed. This starts with the design of the research methodology and continues throughout the collection process. The researcher did not have direct access to the sample group in this study, so some of the bias is removed simply due to lack of contact, which is especially
true in the survey. Utilizing a mixed-method design further opens this possibility with both quantitative and qualitative methods being utilized.

**Selection and sampling bias.** This bias could not be avoided and was designed as part of the research study. The selection of the Special Operation Force community allowed the research to dive into a small elite community, which well serves the study of cross-cultural competency. This community has extensive exposure to cross-cultural interaction, which represents why cultural intelligence in some form is an important factor in the military. Although admittedly this bias exists, it is manageable with open recruitment to all branches of the service that meet the criteria of being in one of the selected units. This sampling is viewed as an enhancing contribution to the study.

Further, the majority of the sample groups consisted of former Special Force and Marine special operation members. The selection of Special Force members was necessary; however, the high number of Marines that responded was due to the researcher’s background in the Marine Corps and snowballing sampling response was heaviest in the Marine community. There are two other biases that accompany the aforementioned defense, inclusive and omission bias. It is true that, due to the small sample group, the research was designed to omit certain military units. Some of this was due to IRB restricting the use of active duty military. The decision was made to use only the former service SOF units.

**Reporting Bias.** This is common today with the large amount of internet information, the volume of positive research conclusions, and the elimination of many null hypothesis findings. As the amount of data grows throughout the many research sources of today, it is becoming common that negative findings are less frequently located. This null hypothesis finding is less likely to surface in a literature review. As this study’s literature review relied to
some degree on the internet, it must be affirmed that this dependence is a potential bias. That being understood, many negative outcomes from lack of cultural competence were documented in the literature review. The university library was relied on heavily and the search sought only credible scholarly sources to include.

The understanding of this bias assisted the researcher in managing this concern, as well as encouraging a deeper examination of data. Moreover, the research produced a null hypothesis, which will contribute to prior literature. This researcher combined positive and negative research findings and represented all these areas throughout the research.

**Measurement bias.** This is yet another factor that arises from the restrictive nature of this research study. Due to the small sample sizes of the study, the quantitative research proved too small to recognize the possibility that the results were actually greater than could be proven through the statistical data, and there is the real possibility that the data is skewed by the size of the sample group. It was important to present the findings to adequately address the hypothesis, rather recognize and address this limitation, as was done in the study.

This researcher also acknowledges that the sample population arrives without previous testing of cultural awareness and this lack of correlation makes the scores acquired in this research study stand alone on their merit. Data about the timing of a participant’s entry into the military, assignment to their units, pre- and post-deployment, and post military service would provide invaluable contributions to future research data. In further research, collecting both individual and peer surveys to identify “playing to the survey” scenarios would be beneficial. While the data may provide correlations between CQ ratings and individual Marine and Special Operation Force members’ characteristics, these correlations do not necessitate causation and would benefit from additional analysis.
One final area to understand is that the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database is an analytical tool that continues to grow and evolve. The study represents a snapshot of the database at this point in time (last 2 quarters of 2016). Just within the time this research was conducted, the base has grown by more than 8,000 participants. There is no reason to think the database will change significantly in the future, but attention must be drawn to this possibility. The database is most useful in identifying where the sample group participants fall on the CQS spectrum, and primary consideration should be given to the standard deviations between the sample groups, rather than to comparisons to the actual database. In fact, the Cultural Intelligence Center considers the median scores of the CQS to be proprietary information. Therefore, it is impossible to provide an accurate standard deviation between the sample group scores and the database.

The CQS does provide a percentage of the individual’s position against the current database of 58,000 participants. The small sample response, comparing 58,000 from the Cultural Intelligence Center database to 35 responses from the sample group, will skew the statistical trends and bias. Furthermore, this comparison should not be considered as significant as the CQS correlation between Groups A and B. However, with this understanding the data remain significant in comparison between the 58,000 and the sample group of 35 participants and the research study data, and are useful to determine where an individual survey participant compares against the database.

**Usefulness of Findings to Stakeholders**

The findings of the study highlight key traits that allow some individuals to function successfully in the military while others fail. In addition, the research examines what factors can improve Cross-Cultural Competency. Although much of the attention of this research is focused
on the Special Operation Force community, the broader intent is to explore characteristics that would help the basic infantry, who face their responsibilities with less training and preparation than their SOF counterparts. Additionally, Bo’s story exemplifies a cause for concern, since the military asks 18-year-old men and women to make life and death decisions with little to no cultural intelligence training.

The study aims to provide the DoD and other professional stakeholders with new material so those stakeholders may use the findings to make a difference in the lives of military and the people caught in conflicts. In the case of the military, the stakeholder is a global community that includes all the lives affected by the presence of a military force within a given geographical area. The military’s ability to navigate such human terrain is critical to the continued success of the DoD.
CHAPTER 4

Results

Outlined in this chapter are the results of the explanatory sequential, mixed method design, which utilized data gathered through three surveys. The intent of this design was to discover purposeful factors that influence cross-cultural competency viewed through the lens of the Cultural Intelligence Scale. The study utilized a purposely-crafted sample group, which consisted of 54 former Special Operation Force (SOF), Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) participants. The design allows data to be explored and for the researcher to identify any correlations between the sub-sample groups (Group A and Group B) and their survey results. Further, the study presents comparison data of scores between the sample groups and the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database of 58,000 participants at the time of this study.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question 1

How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?

H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships included in their missions enabling them to take on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating within a different cultural setting.

H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their heightened cross-cultural relationships of their missions causing them to take on a
unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating
within a different cultural setting.

Research Question 2

How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98
countries and more than 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?

H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Center
for Cultural Intelligence’s database.

H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the
Center for Cultural Intelligence’s database.

Research Question 3

How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute to and
correlate with the CQS survey?

H3o. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlation
patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.

H3a. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover
correlation patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.

Participant Study Variables

The study utilizes the scores taken from Van Dyne et al. (2015) CQS personal assessment
survey as its foundation and in examining correlations among the three surveys. Questions
ranging from education levels, deployment frequencies to cross-cultural areas, religion, and
specific unit assignment addressed just a few of the areas in which the surveys gathered
information. The goal was to offer data analysis to support the CQS scores in addressing the
primary research study question, “What are the identifying factors that affect Cross-Cultural Competency scores within the former Special Operations community?”

The criteria for the sample group participants did not demand combat experience; however, it was a significant factor in the sample group and reflective of the nation’s engagement of more than a decade fighting two wars. In the demographic survey, only 15 percent reported no combat deployments while 56 percent reported three or more combat deployments (Survey Monkey 2016). All quantitative and qualitative survey respondents were granted a seven-day completion schedule; however, in some cases up to 28 days was granted for requested special cases due to participant travel, deployment outside the United States, and emergency medical situations.

From the recruitment efforts, 71 respondents expressed interest in participating in the study. The first quantitative survey—the demographic survey—was administered by sending 71 email requests via Survey Monkey, to which 54 people responded. After eliminating anyone who did not meet the research criteria (membership in SOF, MARSOC, or MEUSOC), the pool was narrowed to 42 participants. Those 42 participants were used in the next step of the quantitative phase: administration of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment survey. From the 42 requests sent to participate in the CQS, 35 participants completed the CQS survey. The results provide a purposeful sample group, with Group A consisting of 25 SOF, MARSOC, and MEUSOC participants, and Group B consisting of 10 Special Force “Green Beret” members.

The final survey was the qualitative open-ended survey also sent via email to the 35 respondents with a final, open-ended survey yield of 30 responses. The qualitative survey was used to support the quantitative survey data.
Quantitative Data Results

The quantitative data was constructed by utilizing a sequential design to facilitate the research. The demographic survey was the first to be sent to the respondents and screened for the required sample group criteria, in order to provide useful evidence to correlate individual CQS scores. The second part of the study was the CQS personal assessment survey, which was the study baseline through the CQS personal assessment survey.

Statistical Methodology for Quantitative Data

The statistical analysis was conducted with IBM SPSS v. 23.0. In this report, data preparation methods are discussed, descriptive statistics are presented, and the research questions are addressed.

Data preparation and descriptive of quantitative data. Data for the 35 participants were imported from Excel into SPSS. In Table 1, descriptive data for the participants are presented. Some missing data were present in the dataset and those responses were omitted from analyses. For this reason, some categories do not add up to 35. More than two thirds of the group members were other Special Forces and only 28.6 percent of respondents were Green Berets. On the whole, the groups had a high education level, with more than 70 percent having at least a bachelor’s degree. Some of the analysis that demonstrates significant majorities were age, with 50 percent ranging from ages 40-49 and an overwhelming white sample group of 72 percent. Religion indicated was 71 percent Christian. Sixty percent participated in three or more deployments to cross-cultural areas, which for most are hostile combat deployments.

To determine if there were any significant demographic predictors within the CQS, the demographic quantitative survey data was prepared for use with a regression model. To do this,
certain variables were collapsed into smaller categories and dummy coded to ensure there were enough respondents in each category to successfully run the model.

This included Race (White vs. Minority) and Region (East vs. West). The next step involved the construction of a regression model to test for significant predictors of Cultural Intelligence Scale scores. This model is sufficient for exploratory research questions such as the one included in the study. The following possible predictors were included in the regression model: Group Type (Group A to include all other special operation units vs. Group B to include only Green Berets), Age, Race, Religion, Region, Education Level, Parents’ Education Level, Language Abilities, and number of deployments. However, this exploratory model concluded with insignificant results, indicating that the particular model was insufficient to predict accurately the outcome variable $F(9, 20) = 1.47, p = .22, R^2 = .40, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .13$.

The researcher then adopted the multiple models of regression where each individual predictor was entered into the model to test for individual effects. Upon conducting this analysis, it was determined that the sole predictor of Cultural Intelligence Scale scores was the number of deployments, with higher numbers of deployments associated with higher CQS scores ($b=.42, p<.05$).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>N, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Other Special Forces</td>
<td>25 (71.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Green Berets</td>
<td>10 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>10 (29.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>23 (71.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African American</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Region</td>
<td>New England</td>
<td>3 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East North Central</td>
<td>5 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East South Central</td>
<td>4 (12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>9 (27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West South Central</td>
<td>4 (12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West North Central</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>4 (12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>3 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Christian/Catholic</td>
<td>24 (70.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>HS Diploma or Less</td>
<td>3 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associates or Some College</td>
<td>7 (21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>13 (39.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>10 (30.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education Level</td>
<td>HS Diploma or Less</td>
<td>14 (42.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associates or Some College</td>
<td>8 (24.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>4 (12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>7 (21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education Level</td>
<td>HS Diploma or Less</td>
<td>14 (42.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associates or Some College</td>
<td>7 (21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>7 (21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>5 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak Another Language?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 (34.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22 (62.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Deployments</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 (17.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>21 (60.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Survey Monkey demographic data created by John Buffin, 2016
After observing the descriptive trends in the data, the scale data from the Cultural Intelligence Scale was calculated. Cultural intelligence (CQ) was assessed with the 20-item Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) by Van Dyne et al. (2015) who demonstrated the scale’s four-factor structure of the construct, along with other psychometric properties such as factor equivalence, reliability, and temporal stability (Appendix E). In the present study, the overall CQ scale had high reliability (a = 0.92), along with its four-dimensional sub-scales: metacognitive CQ (a = 0.90), cognitive CQ (a = 0.91), motivational CQ (a = 0.89), and behavioral CQ (a = 0.90).

All items were measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to confirm the dimensionality of the 20 CQ items. Specifying a model where the four metacognitive items, six cognitive items, five motivational items, and five behavioral items load onto their corresponding CQ facets, and where all CQ facets load onto an overall CQ construct, the model had sufficient fit ($\chi^2 [166] = 421.82 \ p = .00; CFI = 0.91; SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.08$), although some of the fit indices were slightly below the criteria cutoffs suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999).

**Qualitative Data Results**

A summative approach to qualitative content analysis was used to further elucidate trends in the data as well as participant thought processes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The summative content approach to the qualitative analysis allows the researcher to move past the word key counts in the qualitative analysis and examine alternate terms (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach opened more opportunity to expand concepts from the small sample population and provided more depth of information to be extracted from the open-ended survey through “euphemistic versus explicit,” thereby allowing more variables added to the research to enhance
the overall mixed-method design (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285). Tables 8–15 demonstrate a notable difference between frequently used words and what the actual response implies in the study. Use of the summative content analysis allows for the interpretation of the respondent’s words.

Mixed-Method Results

Research Question 1

Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate how the results of selected SOF and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) groups vary on the CSQ self-assessment survey. To determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between Green Berets and Other Special Units, an independent sample t-test was performed to examine between-group differences. While the Group A had a slightly lower average score (M=4.33, SD=.34) than Group B (M=4.24, SD=1.17), (t 31)=4.49, p=.73). There was no statistical significance between the mean CQS scores of Group A, N=25, M=79.64, SD=14.12 and Group B, N=10, M= 87.70, SD=9.25. The researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 2. The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) Scores Reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
<td>79.2000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.75353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group B</td>
<td>87.7000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.25023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81.6286</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.83747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table reflects data from Groups A and B mean scores. Created by John Buffin, 2016

Table 3. Group Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CQS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>79.6400</td>
<td>14.12114</td>
<td>2.82423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>87.7000</td>
<td>9.25023</td>
<td>2.92518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Group standard deviations from CQS, created by John Buffin, 2016
Table 4. *Independent Samples Test for Groups A and B*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQS</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>1.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Independent samples test using IBM SPSS, created by John Buffin, 2016

Table 5. *Independent sample test*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Std. Error Difference</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQS</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>4.85493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>4.06607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table created from IBM SPSS by John Buffin, 2016

**Research Question 2**

How do the sample groups’ scores compare to the database consisting of 98 countries and over 58,000 business participants current as of December 2016? Both Groups A and B completed the Cultural Intelligence Centers database. The CQS report is composed of 20 questions and, although there are no subjectively right or wrong questions, the CQS does provide weight to certain answers, which ultimately provide a score. This score is placed into a percentage and passed along in the report. The CQS provides a group percentage standing
against the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database. It does not provide an overall ranking but breaks down each category and makes the comparison.

Table 6. *Group A Rating Against the Center for Cultural Intelligence’s Database*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CQ Group Scores and the World Wide Norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following summarizes the CQ scores for this group compared to the World Wide Norms

- **CQ Drive**: Average Self-Rated CQ Drive is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 8 points
- **CQ Knowledge**: Average Self-Rated CQ Knowledge is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 15 points
- **CQ Strategy**: Average Self-Rated CQ Strategy is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 20 points
- **CQ Action**: Average Self-Rated CQ Action is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 12 points

Note. This table is taken from the Group A CQS report created by the Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016.
Table 7. Group B Rating Against the Center for Cultural Intelligence’s Database.

The following summarizes the CQ scores for this group compared to the World Wide Norms:

- **CQ Drive**: Average Self-Rated CQ Drive is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 15 points.
- **CQ Knowledge**: Average Self-Rated CQ Knowledge is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 27 points.
- **CQ Strategy**: Average Self-Rated CQ Strategy is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 25 points.
- **CQ Action**: Average Self-Rated CQ Action is GREATER THAN World Wide Norm by 25 points.

Note. This table is taken from the Group B CQS report created by the Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016.
**Research Question 3**

How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute to and correlate with the CQS survey? The qualitative data provide a vast amount of variation in the responses. Qualitative data are used to provide nuance for the quantitative findings and provide a deeper understanding of a specific organization or event, rather than a surface description of a large sample of population. They elucidate an explicit rendering of broad patterns that present in a group of participants and allow one the ability to make sense of the quantitative data in a meaningful way.

The quantitative results provided no significant associations or predictors of cross-cultural attitudes with the exception of multiple deployments correlating with higher CQS scores. Other than that, there were no significant demographic predictors of the cross-cultural scale. In full disclosure, this researcher believes that the variation results are related more to the small sample and diverse unit affiliations selected. If the opportunity was provided to survey a much larger population with a different tool, the research may have provided more proof to meet the hypothesis.

The nature of the qualitative data does not allow for direct correlation to the quantitative data, since qualitative data is not numeric by nature. The qualitative data provided the ability to “dig deeper” into the issues and highlight the diverse range of responses and experiences of the sample group. The Survey Monkey and NVivo analysis software alone do not reflect an accurate representation of the data. In the following tables, a clearer picture is reflected of the respondent’s expressions in the open-ended survey by utilizing the summative approach, which allowed for a deeper understanding of the survey data with clear differences between the NVivo Survey Monkey key words to the summative descriptions.
Tables 8–15 offer an example of the software-driven key words with a side-by-side comparison of the interpretation of the sample groups’ comments in an attempt to define the euphemistic value of the discussion over the softwares more explicit interpretation of the open-ended survey, thus allowing more variables, which lead to the true essence of the comments (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). There are three areas that provide this information with the software key words in the first column, the summative approach in the second column and finally actual comments extracted from the open-ended survey.

Table 8. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understanding Through Summative Content Analysis of Question 1 of the Open-Ended Survey, Understanding of Cognitive, Metacognitive, Motivation, and Behavior Importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Factor</th>
<th>Process Act</th>
<th>Control Experiences</th>
<th>Cross Cultural Behave</th>
<th>Important Outward Thinking</th>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Summative Content Analysis of Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior/Action</strong></td>
<td><strong>Motivation/Drive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Behavior is controlled by the individual; a choice.” “In any culture the way you behave and your gestures will show more than what you might be thinking or it could show your true beliefs.” “This will be evidently reflected through your halfhearted and transparent actions. It is said that 85% of communication is done through body language (behavior).”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“A person's motivation will dictate his/her behavior.” “I chose motivation as the first due to my conscious effort to seek out cross-culture engagements.” “without a desire to interact with or understand other cultures, the others do not matter.” “Motivation is the stimulus or catalyst for action and will be the driving factor on how a person chooses to behave in certain environments.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cognitive/ Knowledge

"Cognitive begins the learning process and is passed along from relatives or close friends within that culture at an early development stage."

"The cognitive aspect is the foundation on which further cross cultural competencies can be developed."

Metacognitive/ Strategy

"Metacognitive is how I would control the situation with the cognitive already ingrained so that would be next to the least important to me."

"Metacognitive follows motivation because you are controlling your learning process and forming it into certain behaviors based off your motivation and beliefs.

Table 9. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of Negative Experiences in Cross-Cultural Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Understanding Led Example Event Foreign Military Cultural Awareness Cross Cultural Team Forces Interpreter Experience | Ugly American and lack of Cross-Cultural Awareness | “Ugly American,” “instance of disrespect and oblivious disregard for another human being,” “American Way, arrogant American,” “Americans treating other cultures as being sub-standard / subservient,” “the soldiers following orders; being rough and aggressive to the villagers, breaking their stuff thru the actions of clearing homes in such a manner, treating them as sympathizers and threats, and arresting "suspicious" individuals,” “no motivation to really care about the differences” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “no motivation to really care about the differences” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language,” “lashed out using adverse verbiage and threatening body language," “I was obviously telegraphing my displeasure” “ranting about the local customs of driving, their dirty living habits etc.” “Unknowingly using body language,” “spit chewing tobacco in a cup inside during a meeting with foreign military commanders,” “I could literally feel some of the respect they held for me drain away,” using offensive
body language, shouting, and demeaning inferences, “cultural awareness classes that I have sat through didn't prepare me,” “Work ethic does not always equate equally when working in a cross-cultural environments”

“We don't use their laws (Islam) effectively,” “slave to political correctness,” “fear of doing or saying something incorrect,” “never took the verbal cues, behavior was adversely affected,” ‘slave to 'cross cultural’ sensitivity.”

“Inaccurate translation.” “field interpreter fails to convey all of the elder's concerns.”

“everything gets lost in translation.”

“The Interpreters became unexpected power brokers.”

Table 10. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of Positive Experiences in Cross-Cultural Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop cross-cultural relationships</td>
<td>“bilateral goodwill,” “trust and respect,” “Support human needs to the culture,” basics of food, shelter, clean water, medical attention.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                             | Military objectives | “Mutual security.”
|                             | Food, drink and more | “dependence on one another.”
|                             | Cross Cultural Involved Knowledge | “security regained.”
|                             |                           | “Isolated mutual experiences.” - “Intelligence sharing through trust and respect.” |
|                             |                           | “Shared meals, tea, social gathering.”
|                             |                           | “honored with special events like weddings.”
|                             |                           | “family and treated as brothers and comradery.”
|                             |                           | “living together through trust and respect.”
|                             |                           | “changing negative perceptions of Americans.”
|                             |                           | “mutual safety and security.”
|                             |                           | “Medical and military assistance.”


“sharing of tactical information towards common goals.”
“sharing of stories with common bonds developed.”
“challenges and learning through trail and error.”
“Reliance on interpreters.”
“interpreter saved our asses”
“personal enlightenment through cross-culture relationships.”
“positive impact on culture.”
Table 11. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of Cultural Training Courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Special Forces Qualification Course, Power, Country Numerous Training | "Special Forces Qualification Course, Power, Country Numerous Training" | "general cross-cultural training."
| Received I Received Annual Sexual Harassment, Poor | "I Received Annual Sexual Harassment, Poor" | "Interactions"
| Basic Language Role | "Basic Language Role" | "prepared and knowledgeable"
| Cultural Awareness and Middle East Training | "Cultural Awareness and Middle East Training" | "foreign language training"
| | | "training with ambiguous cultural situations"
| | | "unconventional warfare"
| | | "sexual harassment and general DoD equal opportunity classes"
| | | "gender and ethnic classes"
| | | "weak"
| | | "adequate"
| | | "Check the box type of training"
| | | "Dari, Pashto, Farsi, Arabic"
| | | "Special Forces course language training"
| | | "6 months of training"
| | | "Defense Language Institute."
| | | "no live role playing"
| | | "Arab culture"
| | | "death by PowerPoint"
| | | "little practical experience"
| | | "lack of encouragement"
| | | "poor and not relevant"
| | | "no practical training"
| | | "trained by people with little experience"
Table 12. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of Visible Factors in the Cultural Iceberg Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Define Abundance Religious Societies Food Middle East Countries Importance Music Depending Cooking Factor | Religion and law of culture | “Religion is the interesting variable for me. In Islamic countries I would always place religion at the top of this list, particularly in a country like Afghanistan.”  
“most cultures derive characteristics from their religious beliefs.”  
 “culture defined mostly by religion.”  
 “Religion in those countries heavily influences literature, fine arts, etc.”  
 “Religion rears its head quite soon and seems to be the most profound cultural indicator.”  
 “Religion=worldview and worldview dictates behavior and relations with others, particularly in non-secular societies…”  
 “Religious beliefs are part of the individual, familial, and tribal culture.”  
 “Religion, or lack thereof, shapes the fabric of most societies, so it is 1.”                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Culture dress and food preparation | “Modest dress, religious considerations (in many cases that was how they defined their relationship to me).”  
 “Dress is the first indication of behavior from the other side of any cross cultural event in a military setting.”  
 “Dress and cooking options.”  
 “ethnic food which is another central point for gathering and commonality among cross cultures, followed by dress.”  
 “Dress in the most visible factor in the Middle East.”  
 “visible factors one immediately takes note of a person’s dress.”  
 “can identify where a person comes from by simply observing the eating patterns of the individual.”  
 “If a woman is fully covered up tells a strong Sharia or Muslim culture.” |
Table 13. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of What Factors Combat Places on Stress and Cultural Competency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive factors of stress identified</td>
<td>“Combat stress brings allies together. Differences tend to be overlooked in light of the importance of survival.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“I have found that stress especially related to combat has forced me to succeed in cross culture environments due to the near imperative and necessity for survival.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“There is no bond like that shared among men who have faced death together.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Combat stress will test the strength of cross-cultural relationships and can be the difference between mission failure or success.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“On rare occasions heightened tensions may force an individual to focus clearer.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative factors of stress identified</td>
<td>“When you lose a buddy on a mission the last thing you care about is taking host nation cultural sensitivities into consideration.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“negative, because in the case of combat stress you revert to what is most familiar and rehearsed.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Generally stress has a negative impact on almost all skills, attitudes, and behavior.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“This clearly was not an appropriate way to communicate and was most likely the result of continued combat stress.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“In Afghanistan I witnessed several stressful scenarios which impacted soldiers in such a way that it appeared as if stress did lead to a negative outcome, and most certainly, an eventual us vs. them mentality.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“&quot;we are brothers here banding together to survive in order to make it home in one piece&quot; and &quot;fuck these backwards people, I do not care.””</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Combat may result in a hatred for other cultures or people due to hardship and loss experienced.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Stress makes tolerance levels drop, especially in a combat environment.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“combat stress will create biased opinions.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of What Factors Combat Places on Stress and Cultural Competency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education preference</td>
<td>“Theory through education helps lessen the learning curve when you go from theory to practice.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Education can give you cross-cultural competencies.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“You must be taught/educated first.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Education explains all of the intricate components, background and overall objectives thus establishing a solid “groundwork.””</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“education can provide intel prior to deployment and when cultural differences.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Practical Immersion without some education of the &quot;why&quot; is akin to monkey see monkey do.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immersion and practical preference</td>
<td>“The majority of individuals are visual and practical immersion is a necessity to fully understand and apply the learned theory.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“practical training will always stay with a student longer.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“nothing can replace immersion training.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Immersion forces an individual to understand the intended target audience in order to effectively communicate and positively influence the outcome.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The greater majority of SOF members learn by doing.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Hands down, I learned far more about both the language and the culture while on immersion.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Learning very rarely comes from a class room environment.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combination of both</td>
<td>“A combination of both is necessary. The saying goes there is no better teacher than experience.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“A healthy mix of education and immersion training is required for a well-rounded SOF operator.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“One without the other will only reduce or limit the SOF member. You have to give him the educational tools and then test him in an environment that allows for mistakes without major consequences.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Education balanced with immersion also is conducive to a confidence in one’s ability to interact well within a strange culture.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15. *Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of What Are the Hidden Factors in the Iceberg Theory*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Space</td>
<td>Physical space management</td>
<td>“How space is arranged is key to early insight into any cross-cultural event.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle Middle East Operate in Order Approach Values Problem Respect Work Ethic Own Perception Indicators Family Ranked Understand</td>
<td>Work ethics</td>
<td>“In many cultures physical space especially between a man and woman can explain a lot.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem solving</td>
<td>“Work ethic is the first thing you will get a feel for in any new culture.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“the stronger of a work ethic a culture has, the more amiable and easier to negotiate with persons of that culture are.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>“I see a lot of disparity in work ethic and problem solving when it comes to different nationalities.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“A significant underlying indicator of cultures is the approach to problem solving.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Despite cultural differences, solving problems is the ultimate goal.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“How do they solve problems will tell you more about a culture than any of the others.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Animal and other areas</td>
<td>“As I mentioned earlier Religion drives every aspect of their lives.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“For the most part, Americans are the most insensitive people regarding modesty and respect for what other cultures regard as sin.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“I put the animal relationship as more of a red flag.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“One has to understand the environment in which one is to operate in order to survive.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Sexual behavior / Reproduction is a primary motivator for all cultures and very powerful.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Problem lies with preconceived notions based off of our learned behaviors from our experiences instead of an identified culture.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of the Study

The purpose of this mixed method explanatory sequential design was to analyze data gathered through the exploration of three surveys to explore the research questions regarding how cross-cultural training and education may affect cross-cultural competency in selected groups of former military Special Operations Force members. The design was to discover purposeful factors that influence cross-cultural competency through the utilization of these three surveys all based on the Cultural Intelligence Scale scores.

The results determined that the only measurable correlation in higher Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) scores was related to the number of deployments in which the individual participated. This provides a possible connection between higher exposure in cross-cultural experiences leading to higher CQS scores. This result reflects an argument that these findings do not reflect many of the stances presented in the literature review, which presented extended cross-cultural interaction as posing a negative influence to cross-cultural interaction. These results invite additional exploration that may show increased cross-cultural interaction to be a positive factor in cross-cultural competency. Additional cross-cultural training, language, and other factors had no measurable correlation in higher CQS scores.

There was a positive trend identifying a substantial difference between the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database and Groups A and B. The sample group participants as a whole performed higher in the rankings compared to the database. Additional research geared toward CQ and the military community is required to elucidate the results.

Given the absence of significant findings, the research suggests the main finding is that the respondents had a wide variety of cross-cultural experiences during their time in military service. This finding does not limit the value of the research, as these experiences were
influenced by a number of factors, including the individual’s background, one’s personal past, one’s training, with whom one interacted while deployed, for example. The cognitive factors seem the main power behind the reported experiences. Furthermore, there is evidence in the responses that each participant interpreted questions differently, which contributed to the variants collected.

In conclusion, the use of a mixed method design was intended to identify factors that have an impact on Cross-Cultural Competency within the Special Operations community while identifying variables that could be connected to CQS scores. The argument is made throughout the literature review that these men are unique and exposed to extreme conditions and situations. Further, they are subjected to higher rates of violent combat experiences, an understanding of which provides one explanation for questions being interpreted in multiple ways by the different respondents. This could have influenced the findings, for which there is evidence in the mixed method approach.
CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This chapter reviews the findings and identifies areas for future research with a primary focus on examining what, if any, differences existed between the sample group populations divided into Group A and Group B. The concept hypothesized that due to the unique mission requirements of Special Forces “Green Berets,” they would out-perform other Special Operation units in the study. The sample group consisted of former military Special Operations members as the foundation, with the concept to examine the Department of Defense (DoD) though the lens of smaller elite units, which made up Groups A and B.

The research focused on definitive areas within the construct of cross-cultural exchanges, with the understanding that cross-culture competency occupies a significant place within the military. Furthermore, the research provided an examination of why cultural understanding is so important, steps the DoD has taken to identify and modify previous cross-cultural training in the post 9/11 era, and provides possible areas for future research.

The research specifically examined the Earley and Ang (2003) concept of cultural intelligence (CQ) and introduced CQ and the self assessment survey referred to as the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS). This chosen tool is utilized to measure sample participants’ levels of personal cross-cultural awareness. The measurement tool was used to establish a baseline assessment ranking that correlates the CQS personal assessment scores in several areas. These areas included (a) examining the sample Groups A and B CQS scores and comparing those scores against each other.

The purpose was to identify if Group B outperformed Group A, which was defended as a possibility due to members’ need for higher need for cross-cultural competency. Furthermore,
the combination of the CQS scores and the results from the demographic survey data were used to identify correlations between categories and CQS scores; (b) compare the sample groups’ CQS scores against the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database of more than 58,000 participants to understand how the military compared; and (c) use the qualitative open-ended surveys to define common ground within the sample groups and to identify positive and negative correlations in the data.

The results demonstrated a variation of CQS scores between the groups, as well as identifying that both groups performed extremely well as compared against the database. However, the only correlations between the demographic survey and the CQS assessment was the discovery that the frequency of deployment rates correlated to higher CQS scores.

The open-ended survey allowed for the participants to write opinions, describe experiences, and share their concept of cross-cultural interaction, which for the majority of the participants occurred in highly stressful combat environments. This survey was one of the greatest attributes of this study. More than 55 percent of the (n=54) participants reported three or more tours in combat areas, with more than 21 percent reporting one to two tours in combat areas. Less than 15 percent of the participants reported not having experienced combat.

**Interpretation of the Results**

Although the representation and experience of the former military Special Operations sample group was notable, the small sample size of the research was a major factor that limited the exploration of relationship data and trends between demographic variables. Furthermore, due to the small size of the sample group trends that do exist may not surface without significant modeling and manipulation, which in an exploratory endeavor would not be a positive position to assume. The mixed-method design allowed for a practical means to meet with the primary
limitation of the researcher living and conducting the research from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the necessity of relying on online surveys.

The sample group members were selected due to their designation as former members of the specified groups. The call for assistance was disseminated through multiple Special Operations Forces private social media groups and did not define specifically or seek a particular service branch with the exception of Group B, whose members by design were required to come from the Special Forces, “Green Beret” community (Appendix B). Group A was open to former members of the Marines, Army, Air Force, and Navy. Although not truly a limitation nor by design, there were minimal participants representing the Rangers, SEALs, and Para Rescue in Group A. This was primarily due to the researcher’s access and direct connection to the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations community and snowball sampling; thus, the majority of Group A represented Force Reconnaissance and Marine Special Operations Command Marines.

The study provided insight through the data collection via the mixed-method approach. The three surveys provided correlations between CQS scores and demographic data, as well as the addition of the qualitative study conducted to enhance the quantitative data. There were three areas key to providing useful data toward the construction of conclusions.

**Quantitative Phase: Survey Results**

The study was designed as an explanatory sequential mixed-method design (Creswell, 2013). The demographic survey was the first issued and laid the foundation for the sequential surveys. The survey eliminated participants that failed to meet the criteria of membership in Special Operations Forces, (Green Berets, Rangers, MARSOC, Para Rescue, SEALs or Special Boat Units) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), (Force Reconnaissance, Reconnaissance Battalion, and Marine Scout Snipers). It also provided
invaluable information that led to the correlation that frequent deployment rates lead to higher CQS scores.

Quantitative Phase: Cultural Intelligence Scale

The CQS was provided to 54 interested participants resulting in 35 total responses. The CQS provided an individual assessment of each participant as well as group scores from each respective group. The results from both surveys were used specifically in research questions one and two.

Qualitative Phase: Open-Ended Survey

The open-ended surveys examined the conscious minds of the sample group participants. It offered the opportunity to collect solicited data that supported the quantitative information and allowed for a deeper examination of the participants. In addition to providing new information, the feedback section provided a review of the warriors’ stories as some of the participants relayed their experiences in cross-cultural environments. Table 16 provides excerpts derived from a collection of comments from the sample groups regarding the four factors—cognitive, metacognitive, behavior, and motivation.

Findings

Although the sample size was small, the data compiled in the qualitative phase are arguably more illuminating than the quantitative data. For instance, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated behavior and motivation as the most important variables of cultural competence, which surfaced from the cultural iceberg questions in the open-ended survey. The responses of the hidden factors of the iceberg theory provided deep meaning to the research and ties directly to the literature review. Therefore, it is reasonable to connect this data to the curriculum that the DoD uses to train soldiers in cultural competency.
The research analysis from this study would suggest that servicemembers respond well to these areas and future training should be highly reliant on behavior modifications as well as redirecting and stimulating individual motivation. The importance of motivation has been repeated throughout the literature review and further reinforced in the quantitative and qualitative data from this study. Aligning this information with future DoD curricula that incorporate such relevant knowledge of motivation and behavior factors could prove to be highly successful.

The mixed-method approach offers two primary categories of data collection: first, the statistical data; second, through the more personal insight produced in words expressed in the open-ended survey.

The qualitative phase enhanced with the summative approach of the study proved productive. The findings presented insight to two major areas revealed between Group A and Group B. The first finding was the difference in the level of cross-cultural training, especially in the area of language and immersion. The second finding was the identification of major differences in how each group was introduced to cross-cultural combat or training situations. Group B (Special Forces members) seemed to present a better understanding and ability to process correct cross-cultural relationships. Furthermore, this group identified when verbal and non-verbal errors are made, process the situation, and counter with logical decision making.

The summative concept approach enlightened the multiple layers, which may not have been so easily identified in stand-alone statistical data. The mixed-method results of the study suggest that Special Force members are better prepared prior to cross-cultural interaction through language school and training exercises. Furthermore, the mission of the Green Berets lends itself to remain highly functional within foreign cultures. Research evidence has also demonstrated that SF members are immersed in cross-cultural environments (embedded with indigenous
cultures) more frequently than the members of Group A. The specialty design of the Special Forces team serves them well and provides an immediate welcome to their presence in many cultures. Some of these needs were identified in the open-ended survey as important and positive factors of interpersonal, cross-cultural acceptance with the attention to basic human needs (food, shelter, clean water, medical assistance, and protection).
Table 16. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of Question 1 of the Open-Ended Survey, Understanding of Cognitive, Metacognitive, Motivation and Behavior Importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Monkey NVivo analysis</th>
<th>Frequent Identified Words</th>
<th>Recurring Summative Content Analysis of Open-Ended Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Factor Process Act Control Experiences Cross Cultural Behave Important Outward Thinking</td>
<td>Behavior/Action</td>
<td>&quot;Behavior is controlled by the individual; a choice.” “In any culture the way you behave and your gestures will show more than what you might be thinking or it could show your true beliefs.” “This will be evidently reflected through your halfhearted and transparent actions. It is said that 85% of communication is done through body language (behavior).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation/Drive</td>
<td>“A person's motivation will dictate his/her behavior.” “I chose motivation as the first due to my conscious effort to seek out cross-culture engagements.” “Without a desire to interact with or understand other cultures, the others do not matter.” “Motivation is the stimulus or catalyst for action and will be the driving factor on how a person chooses to behave in certain environments.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive/Knowledge</td>
<td>“Cognitive begins the learning process and is passed along from relatives or close friends within that culture at an early development stage.” “The cognitive aspect is the foundation on which further cross cultural competencies can be developed.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metacognitive/Strategy</td>
<td>“Metacognitive is how I would control the situation with the cognitive already ingrained so that would be next to the least important to me.” “Metacognitive follows motivation because you are controlling your learning process and forming it into certain behaviors based off your motivation and beliefs.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Special Forces team may be better equipped and possess the ability to serve a small cross-cultural community with a vast amount of specific skills that include leadership, language,
A high level of medical skill, engineering, communication, and defensive tactics. The important factor the SF team introduces is specialty skills, which are required to work independently, but perhaps more important is that their skills provide a direct link to the basic human survival needs that transcend to any culture in the world. This differs from Group A members, who are more direct-action-based, meaning they are less reliant on cross-cultural interaction and with an entirely different mindset, mainly due to a different mission statement. Through the mixed-method research data it is clear that sample Group A was not as well prepared for the cross-cultural challenges as Group B was. This was especially clear in the open-ended survey, with many references to inadequate cultural training and no foreign language preparation, including complaints there was a lack of knowledge passed along, and not even providing basic training with host language key phrases.

Such lack of preparation for Group A leads to more mistakes made in the field, as their only exposure to the culture is through forced immersion. More negative factors surfaced from Group A and less tolerance for understanding the culture in which they were operating was evident in the open-ended survey. Although a lack of preparation and training was more prevalent in Group A, they still managed high CQS scores, which may suggest military members are highly suitable for cross-cultural interaction. Cross-cultural mistakes were reported from both groups with two especially interesting situations reported from Group B.

On two separate occasions members from Group B reported major interteam cultural mishappenings that caused great disrespect to host nationals. This experience was reported to be so difficult that, in both cases, the respondents claimed to have never spoken with the offenders since. Group B members’ awareness appears to be extremely keen and sensitive to the nature of cross-cultural competency—more so than that of Group A.
The open-ended survey responses from Group B provided extended explanations of cross-cultural situation awareness leading to the hypothesis that the mission statement and training Group B possesses makes them more adept to identify cultural mistakes and offer alternative methods to prevent future mistakes. Group A responded more with an “us versus them” attitude and even when cultural mistakes were made, the members from Group A seemed to dismiss them with no ill feelings towards the offenders.

Group B also commented that a great amount of their learning is gathered through interactions with other seasoned team members, who provided useful information about areas of operation. The qualitative survey provided depth to the research and boosted ambiguous quantitative results, which this researcher believes were due to the low sample group numbers. Viewing the three surveys through the qualitative lens allowed a better grasp of the data. Examining the descriptive statistics with the open-ended survey provides a clearer overall picture of the findings.

**Key Implications**

These are examples of key associations that surfaced in the study and will be important to consider in selecting future research.

**Self and peer evaluations.** Combining self and peer evaluations would provide a more in-depth picture of the individual and allow for a more thorough review of the CQS between the participant and the CQ representative. The peer evaluations provide a useful end product that negates the potential bias, such as an individual presenting a strong, unchecked social bias. This is highly possible in any study, with participants answering the way they think society wants them to answer. The literature review presented a case of large deviations between self- and peer evaluations (Braziel, 2011).
This case study presented the problem of self-evaluations and how individuals might view their own actions as in tune with the cross-cultural situation under the assumption they were operating correctly, while peers or host nationals draw a completely different conclusion. As Braziel’s (2011) study demonstrated this scenario, without the peer evaluation the military Foreign Affairs Officers would have continued believing their behavior was agreeable to the host nationals. The CQS does allow for a peer evaluation; however, the peers are selected by the individual and are liable to support the individual’s bias.

A clearer path would offer the flexibility for coworker’s involvement, whereas in the case of this study it would have provided military unit members an opportunity to report how the individual’s actions are perceived through the eyes of peers.

**Better understanding stress.** The correlation of higher CQS scores to more frequent deployment schedules argues against literature presented in chapter 2, which contended that due to frequent deployments of SOF units, their ability to manage stress was diminished. One hypothesis for the correlation may be that many of the participants have been removed from combat for a period of time that has allowed them to settle and transform stress into positive cognitive power. This possibility, combined with natural increased motivation levels that may be responsible for positive behavior change, may be attributed to the length of time out of the service. This is an area that requires additional research to fully identify the trend.

**Allocating supporting commitments to training across DoD.** The lack of an accepted method to measure individual cross-cultural self-awareness is important in establishing a program to be evaluated over time. The decision should be made where and when to introduce cross-cultural training and to monitor data to evaluate if a particular direction improves service
members’ awareness. Further, using a system to evaluate possible cross-cultural challenges could be the first step to avoid the next international incident.

**Summative concept approach to qualitative open-ended survey data.** The use of the summative concept approach of the open-ended questions produced remarkable data that was not obvious from the qualitative Survey Monkey and NVivo software word generating tools. The open-ended survey comments yielded additional information that far outweighed and redirected the true attention of the qualitative process. The following is a brief summary of the eight areas where discussion was encouraged with the summary reflecting the actual phrases and words selected from the 30 respondents of the open-ended survey.

**Four factors of importance.** The key words selected by the NVivo Survey Monkey software were “Action, Factor, Process, Act, Control, Experiences, Cross Cultural, Behave, Important, Outward Thinking.” These words alone do not express the participants’ responses, but through the summative approach, the researcher was able to extract and articulate the intent of the participants. The key area most discussed was the weight placed on the importance of behavior and motivation.

These conclusions were echoed throughout the open-ended survey. A few participants examined the cognitive factors and defended these as a basis for one’s current path, although the defense evolved around the importance of behavior and motivation. There was also a correlation warranted between metacognitive and behavior; an agreeable argument of the researcher as well. The relearning and reshaping of cognitive factors is part of the learning process and behavioral change.

**Positive cultural events.** The key words selected by the software were, “Develop, Occasions, Operation, Interaction, Village, Country, Local, Successful, Able, Week Long,
Understanding, American Military, Drinking, Cross Cultural, Involved, Knowledge.” These words alone do not express the participants’ responses fully, but through the summative approach, the researcher could extract the participants’ intent. A summary of key concepts suggests positive cultural interaction delivers bilateral goodwill through the support of basic human needs, (food, shelter, security, and medicine). Additional attention was focused on the sharing of meals, stories, common bonds, and the shared experience of isolation.

**Negative cultural events.** The key words selected by the software were “Understanding, Led, Example, Event, Foreign Military, Cultural Awareness, Cross Cultural, Team, Forces, Interpreter, Experience, Religious Beliefs, Marine, Ugly American, Body Language, Face, Local, Tactical, Mission.” These words alone do not express the participants’ responses fully, but through the summative approach, the researcher was able to better extract the intent of the participants. The key areas that were most discussed described an “Ugly American.” Additionally, there were several critical points drawn about not using religion and Islamic law to assist in the mission, with political correctness hindering actual progress by using the tools the culture is using.

One of the most common areas discussed and one that directly relates to cross-cultural awareness and good communication skills was the issue of body language. Verbal and non-verbal communication are an important part of being cross-culturally competent. For many of the warriors who did not possess Arabic, Dari, or Pashtu language capabilities, there was a great reliance on non-verbal communication. Many negative examples are discussed throughout the survey.

Throughout the survey descriptions of mistakes were made that ranged from using chewing tobacco to outright humiliation and mistreatment of the local indigenous community.
This question offered the most enlightening examination of problems of cross-cultural interaction between the military and the indigenous populations that are affected by their presence.

*Cultural training.* The key words selected by the software were “Special Forces Qualification Course, Power, Country, Numerous Training, I Received Annual Sexual Harassment, Basic Language, Role Cultural Awareness, Poor, Middle East.” These words provide a brief understanding of the descriptions told by the survey participants; however, they fail to fully provide the deep explanation of the responses. This was one of the questions that offered a greater volume of qualitative data and allowed for clear distinctions between Groups A and B. Group A appears to be much less prepared for cross-cultural interaction than Group B.

The Special Forces Qualification Course (Q Course) (Group B) alone has built-in training that places the students in ambiguous cross-cultural situations. After completion of the Q course, the members from Group B continue cultural endeavors at the Defense Language Institute where they are immersed into an assigned language. The classroom immersion introduces students to language and culture experts, thus providing them a strong foundation. Group A members are not exposed to such intense, focused training and are more likely to report receiving a class from someone who is not an expert on the culture discussed.

Although both groups reported receiving the standard equal opportunity and sexual harassment classes, Group A members were the only ones to answer the questions with comments such as, “weak, painful, inadequate, and just checking the box.” Group B members report positive cultural training. Finally, although both groups encouraged more training of any type, the majority agreed that practical, reality-based training and immersion was of most use.
Visible iceberg factors. The key words selected by the software where, “Define, Abundance, Religious, Societies, Food, Middle East Countries, Importance, Music, Depending, Cooking, Factor.” Religion and Islamic law were frequently discussed as being a part of the visible concepts from the iceberg theory. As most of the participants worked in Islamic cultures, this was an obvious area that dominated the answers. Religion has a strong presence in all the responses and the reality of religious connections to nearly every visible factor, demonstrates that religion truly intertwines every aspect of Islamic life.

As the theme of religion continued, the next areas where most agreed involved the importance of local dress (clothing) of the culture as a key signal, followed by food. Others considered even deeper expressions that literature, art, and games also play an essential role in defining the visible factors. One participant from Group B picked up and expanded on language as being the largest factor that is visible in the iceberg theory. This response was interesting as many different languages are spoke in Afghanistan, but to provide context, these languages are regionally specific.

Hidden iceberg factors. The key words selected by the software were, “Physical Space Handle Middle East, Operate in Order, Approach, Values Problem, Respect, Work Ethic, Own Perception, Indicators, Family, Ranked, Understand.” They key concepts from the content focuses heavily on work ethic and problem solving, as these two areas were the theme of the majority of respondents. Additionally, the concept of religion was present, but again, this response in the survey is to be expected with such a high concentration of the sample group working in Islamic cultures. Another area that surfaced was the attention given to the observation of physical space and how space is managed by a culture.
Many of the respondents commented on judging some of these hidden factors of positive perceptions on how physical space was organized. Furthermore, there was great attention given to how the culture treated animals. Given that animal rights are associated with western culture, and many throughout the world view animals far differently than Americans, it was concerning that the respondents placed such importance on this factor, although it is understandable. Other less mentioned areas but still notable included the perception by a culture of beauty, sin, laws, tribal rules, and animals’ connection to wealth and survivability.

**Preferred method of training—education or practical.** The key words selected by the software were, “Hands, Likely, Foundation, Skills, Culture Education Helps, Practical Training, Followed, Experience, Believe, Environment, Cross-cultural, Practical Application.” This was one of the areas where Groups A and B agreed on the overall importance of practical training.

Although defense was given for education (theory) instruction, most participants encouraged the combination or preference of practical and immersion training. Many examples were provided over concern that the best method to instruct a warrior is through hands-on training. This was proposed as role-playing, reality based training, direct immersion in culture, and the sharing of stories from other team members, all of which prepare an individual for what the culture will have in store for them.

**Stress and combat stress effect on cross-cultural communication.** The key words selected by the software were, “Enemy, Question, Host, Answer, Event, Level, Positive Experience, Negative, Survival, Individual Importance, Context, Local, Result, Qualify Situation.” This was another area that defined the two groups with a noticeable trend, with Group A more pessimistic and Group B supporting a more optimistic view. Some of the most
negative answers were produced from Group A participants. The question was described in two parts after reading through the responses.

With regard to negative and positive stress, surprisingly there were many responses reporting positive conditions taken from high combat stress situations. The discussion offered that stress might bring allies together in a common fight, where differences tend to be overlooked in light of the importance of survival. Reporting that stress, especially related to combat, forced some to succeed in cross cultural environments due to the near imperative and necessity for survival. Other comments relayed the correlation between the stress of combat and death and that the very bond that is shared among men who have faced death together is a positive condition. Another acknowledged concept is that combat stress will test the strength of cross-cultural relationships and can be the difference between mission failure or success, and on rare occasions, heightened tensions may force an individual to focus more clearly.

The negative concepts were dark in some cases, as expected from such hostile conditions that combat brings. Responses concerning the welfare of Marines was the only concern, and when losing a buddy on a mission, the last thing one cares about is taking host nation cultural sensitivities into consideration. A very interesting connection to proper preparation for these situations was explained as in the case of combat stress, where one reverts to what is most familiar and rehearsed. The truth that one will not rise to the occasion, but instead lower to the training, is borne out by the data. Generally, stress has a negative impact on almost all skills, attitudes, and behavior.

Instances were relayed where military members reacted differently to the same situation as one participant from Group A described a situation in Iraq. During a turnover of area responsibility, the new leadership overreacted to a controlled situation. The participant described
the actions as clearly not an appropriate way to communicate and were most likely the result of continued combat stress. Other stories relayed from Group A in Afghanistan described witnessing several stressful scenarios that had an impact on soldiers in such a way it appeared as if stress did lead to a negative outcome, and most certainly, an eventual “us versus them mentality.”

Other comments defined the “us versus them mentality,” with one participant from Group A explaining they were all brothers, banding together to survive to make it home in one piece, and "fuck these backwards people, I do not care.” Finally, the understanding emerged that combat may result in a hatred for other cultures or people due to hardship and loss, which induces the stress that makes tolerance levels drop, especially in a combat environment. That is to say, combat stress may create biased opinions.

**Recommendations for Future Study**

Future study offers a plethora of areas that require definition and exploration. The first area of recommendation is that the DoD continue to pursue a measurement tool to assess and evaluate DoD military members throughout their years of service. More importantly for that concept to be useful is to establish a timeline to select the tool to be used to measure 3C. Cultural intelligence is just one option used in this study. By selecting a measurement tool, the study provided a foundation to compare two groups.

Additional attention directed at the SOF community could prove invaluable in future study. Concentration on one joint service entity should prove a worthy basis to expand research to all members of the DoD. The DoD has not been without adventure in its pursuit to assist military leadership on the battlefield. The Human Terrain System (HTS) provides a solid example of alternative thinking and, because the program did not mature to a permanent
program, does not indicate it was without success. Many in military leadership expressed support and relayed stories of success with the HTS program but internal conflicts within the social science community were not well thought through as the DoD sought a quick correction with a “stop, shoot, and aim” mentality. This is a continuing process and, with the current lull in action, it is now a suitable opportunity to stop, aim, and shoot.

One area of concern and for future study involves the stress element of cultural intelligence. As one participant commented in the open-ended survey, combat stress caused the individual to revert to what is most familiar and rehearsed. Grossman, (2008) an expert on the military, combat stress, and mindset, elaborates on this idea through a scientific foundation on the importance of understanding stress inoculation training. This training is used to prevent a fear-induced stress response that will occur without prior training. This fear-induced stress response is what pushes the individual to revert to what is most familiar and activates a defensive mechanism that can prove harmful to stakeholders (Grossman, 2008). Grossman, (2008) argues that “In combat you do not rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training” (Chapter 2). Cultural intelligence and awareness have been an afterthought and are not built in to the core fundamentals of the warrior ethos the combat mindset usually entails. Thus when stressed, the combination of the body’s “fight or flight” response and learned experiences of the warrior may overshadow what may be assumed as an understanding of cultural intelligence.

Summary of the Study

The summary of this study reflects responses provided by a small unique sample group representing former servicemembers with special skilled backgrounds. It has been mentioned throughout the study that the intent of any research should be to add to existing studies and to encourage others to expand understanding of the topic. The mixed-method design of this
research study provided a check and balance for the research; both complemented one another and addressed the research questions that guided the study.

The study demonstrated the importance of the qualitative component of the research. When examining Cross-Cultural Competency, the words of the sample group hold great weight in the study. Without the qualitative side of this research, the study would have been incomplete; furthermore, it would not have relayed a true sense of the major concerns when addressing cross-cultural interaction in combat areas. The sample group presented not only a highly trained Special Operator, but one who has frequent deployments to a hostile combat area. This sample group has witnessed first-hand the horrors of war and is a group willing to discuss their experiences and personal stories.

Learning through storytelling is a gift and one that has been used throughout human history as it addresses the need for communication with one another. Through the open-ended survey, there seemed to be a need from the participants to discuss their stories and to pass along important parts of their individual stories. Perhaps for many, this was the first time they were able to relay their stories through the lens of a cross-cultural learning environment. Moreover, there is evidence that many of these warriors are similar in their core specialty training and mindset; although there remain diverse outcomes from their individual experiences. The researcher discovered there are connections to cross-cultural education through experiences.

In conclusion, experience is an interesting concept that the majority of the participants stressed. The sample group made clear the importance of learning by practical exercise over purely theoretical education. Overwhelmingly, the sample group identified positive learning through practical exercise, immersion type training, and by learning through “sharing of stories”
from peers who have experience with a specific culture. This research study presented data that is relevant to contemporary military concerns in the arena of cross-cultural competency.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

Appendix A

Appendix A

To: John Buffin
Cc: Grania Holman
From: Olgun Guvench
Date: October 18, 2016

Project # & Title: 072016-011, A STUDY OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE ON FORMER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE MEMBERS: HOW EDUCATION MAY PLAY A ROLE IN CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCY (Initial)

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects has reviewed the above captioned project, and has determined that the proposed work is exempt from IRB review and oversight as defined by 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

Additional IRB review and approval is not required for this protocol as submitted. If you wish to change your protocol at any time, you must first submit the changes for review.

Please contact Olgun Guvench at (207) 221-4171 or oguvench@une.edu with any questions.

Sincerely,

Olgun Guvench, M.D., Ph.D.
IRB Chair

IRB#: 072016-011
Submission Date: 7/19/16
Status: Exempt, 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2)
Status Date: 10/18/16
Appendix B

Call for assistance and participants

Gents, I am a former infantry and Force Reconnaissance Marine and in my fourth year of a doctoral program at the University of New England. I am conducting research on Cross-Cultural Competency within the military by using a current business model called Cultural Intelligence (CQ). I have selected two uniquely special groups to use as my target populations.

Group one consists of former Special Operation Force members (MARSOC, Force Recon, SEALs, SF, Rangers and PJ’s) who served pre- and post-9/11 and are no longer in the military. Group two consists of only former Army Special Forces members. Also participants should have at least part of that service post-9/11, and both combat and non-combat experience is fine.

**Participant Requirements:** About an hour of your time is needed to take three surveys in the privacy of your choosing via an online format. One is a Survey Monkey questionnaire with only demographic questions. The second is a Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) provided through the Cultural Intelligence Center and the third is an open-ended short answer survey. After receipt of your email you will be provided links to all these surveys and consent forms to complete and return to the researcher. Once the surveys are competed your email address will be removed from the research.

Thank you in advance for your assistance and if there are any questions I am more than happy to address them for you in a private message on Facebook or may provide you an email address to contact me.

Life long learner,

John Buffin
Appendix C

Consent for Participation

University of New England

CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN DEMOGRAPHICAL AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE SCALE RESEARCH SURVEY’S

Project Title:
A Mixed Method Study of Former Special Operations Community: Identifying Factors That Effect Cross-Cultural Competency

Principal Investigator(s): John Buffin, BA in Organizational Management, Ashford University; Master of Professional Studies in Homeland Security, Pennsylvania State University, (203) 788-3142 or johnbuffin@gmail.com. Dr. Grania Holman, faculty advisor, gholman@une.edu, 1(678)234-2414

University of New England Consent for Participation in Research

Introduction:
General requirement language:

The purpose of this form is to provide you with information about the research study and, if you choose to participate, to document your decision.

Please ask any questions about this study, now, during, or after the project is complete. Once you agree and commit to the research you will be sent an email with links to three surveys. The research is dependent upon the prompt fulfillment of the surveys and you are given seven days to complete the surveys. Each survey is brief and should not consume more than 30 minutes of your time to complete. Your participation is voluntary but appreciated by the researcher.

Why is this study being done?
This research is conducted to identify variants and similarities of cultural competence between former Special Operation Force (SOF) members using the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment survey. In particular the research will compare Army Special Forces “Green Berets” as a group to other members of the SOF community. The findings will be used to determine if cultural intelligence (CQ), currently used as a tool in the business arena to
measure one’s level of cultural intelligence self-awareness, may be used within the military as a tool to identify variants between the two groups CQS scores, which ultimately seeks to assist warriors to improve cross-cultural self-awareness.

This research study is used in the principal investigator’s doctoral dissertation and proves a valuable link to further research within the military units and within Special Operation Force community.

Who will be in this study?

As a part of a specific community within the Special Operations family, you are among the target population selected for the study. The participants hale from all branches: Army’s Special Forces; Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance; Scout Snipers; MARSOC Raider Battalions; Army Rangers; Navy Seal Air and Land (SEALs); Special Boat Unit; Air Force Para Rescue; and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) commands.

What will I be asked to do?

There are three surveys that will be emailed to you with hyperlinks to each. Two of the hyperlinks are an online platform you have likely experienced in the past known as Survey Monkey. The first is a basic survey to gather your demographic data through five cultural awareness questions, which will primarily be used to assign you into one of two groups. Group I will consist of all Special Operations members with the exception of Army Special Forces (SF). The Army SF members will make up group II. The second survey comes from the Cultural Intelligence Center and is known as the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS). The CQS contains twenty questions on how you would feel in certain cross-cultural situations. It measures your cognitive, metacognitive, behavior, and motivation in the context of cross-culture interactions. This data provides the Center with information about you and compares your responses to over 58,000 other surveys collected from participants from 98 countries within the business arena. At the conclusion of the CQS personal assessment survey you receive a report that outlines your score and provides a written explanation with suggestions as to why you scored the way you did. The third survey is an open-ended survey where short descriptive comments about cross-cultural interaction will be required. If you have further questions after the completion of the CQS the researcher will be free to review your results. Contact John Buffin at johnbuffin@gmail.com for further questions.

None of the methods used in this research study are experimental or unusual. Although your participation is brief, it will provide critical data essential to adding to existing research within the private sector and the Department of Defense research database. This is essential to expanding research for the future success of cross-cultural competency.
Your participation in this study is via your personal email account and you will be asked to provide a limited amount of personal information. This will be the only identifying information, which will only be seen by the researcher. At the completion of the collection of the final surveys all personal information will be destroyed and your data will only be identified as a participant in Group I or II. If you have additional questions please feel free to contact John Buffin johnbuffin@gmail.com.

**What are the possible risks of taking this study?**

There are no reasonable foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study. If you have additional concerns or questions feel free to contact John Buffin.

**What are the possible benefits of taking this study?**

Your personal contribution to this research is significant and, while it may not directly benefit you in the short term, it provides future research designed to assist with positive and productive methods to enhance an individual military member’s capability in war and at home. The findings will inform how an individual’s self-awareness is built and how well an individual is able to communicate in a cross-cultural environment.

**What will it cost me?**

The two surveys take approximately thirty minutes to complete and you may stop and pick back up at anytime. We suggest you allow thirty minutes in a quiet place to complete the surveys in one shot but this is up to you and your schedule. Review the questions briefly and provide honest answers.

**How will my privacy be protected?**

Your privacy and the security require protection of data and confidentiality and it is the first priority of the researcher. There is limited personal information kept during the research process, (only email address in the initial stage and your name provided to the Cultural Intelligence Center for the CQS). As your total anonymity in the study is impossible to obtain, email addresses and names will be assigned a pseudonym label and your email address and name will be removed after the surveys are completed; only a label identifier Group I or Group II remains. This approach serves to transition the study from a confidential study to an anonymous study once your true email address is excluded.
To further ensure confidentiality the data is stored on a personal password-protected laptop; password-protected external, back up hard drive; and maintained in a secure location to which only the researcher has access. The trust and bond built between researcher and you must continue and is achieved through careful collection, limitation, and eventual removal of your self-identifying information.

Feel free to contact John Buffin johnbuffin@gmail.com with any privacy concerns or questions.

**How will my data be kept confidential?**

In the aforementioned section about privacy no personal information will be kept about you at the conclusion of the surveys. The data will be stored on password-protected computers and external hard drives at the home office of John Buffin. Further, all of the research materials will be kept in a secure area under lock and key within the home office of John Buffin.

Please note that the University of New England Institutional Review Board (IRB) is a committee formally designated to approve, to monitor, and to review biomedical and behavioral research involving humans and may review the research records.

A copy of your signed consent form will be maintained by the principal investigator for at least 3 years after the project is completed before it is destroyed. The consent forms will be stored in a secure location that only the researcher will have access to and will not be affiliated with any data obtained during the project.

Transfer of data via the internet will be necessary to facilitate this study and all data will be downloaded and maintained on hard drives and not in any cloud system.

The research findings will be posted in the dissertation of John Buffin for his Doctorate in Education at the University of New England. An electronic copy can be made available if requested by a participant.

**What are my rights as a research participant?**

Your participation is voluntary. Your decision to participate will have no impact on your current or future relations with the University of New England.

You may skip or refuse to answer any question for any reason.

If you choose not to participate there is no penalty to you and you are free to withdraw from this research study at any time, for any reason.
Whom may I contact with questions?

The researcher conducting the study is John Buffin. For questions or more information concerning this research you may contact them at: John Buffin johnbuffin@gmaill.com (203)-788-3142.

The committee chairperson is Dr. Grania Holman who may be reached at gholman@une.edu (678) 234-2414.

If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you may call Olgun Guvench, M.D. Ph.D., Chair of the UNE Institutional Review Board at irb@une.edu or by phone at (207) 221-4171.

Will I receive a copy of this consent form?

You may copy this electronic version for your records, which will serve as your copy of the consent form.

Participant’s Statement

I understand the above description of this research and the risk and benefits associated with my participation as a research subject in the demographic and Cultural Intelligence Scale personal assessment survey and the possibility of being selected for the open-ended qualitative survey. I agree to take part in the research and do so voluntarily. I understand that as this is an electronic version of this agreement, a typed name in the signature line is acceptable if a signature cannot be reasonably completed and returned to the researcher.

Please sign and return this consent within two days of receipt to confirm your participation in the study.

________________________________________________________
Participant’s signature or printed name                      Date

________________________________________________________
Printed Name
Appendix D

Quantitative Demographic Survey I

Cultural Intelligence

1. What is your age?

- 17 or younger
- 18-20
- 21-29
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60 or older

2. Please select from the choices below with what race you identify.

- White
- Black or African-American
- American Indian or Alaskan Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- From multiple races
- Some other race (please specify)

3. In which U.S. Region did you spend most of your youth or do you consider home?

- New England
- Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

4. Do you identify with any of the following religions? (Please select all that apply.)

- Protestantism
- Catholicism
- Christianity
- Judaism
- Islam
- Buddhism
- Hinduism
- Native American
- Inter/Non-denominational
- No religion
- Other (please specify)
5. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree
- Bachelor degree
- Graduate degree

6. What is the highest level of school your father completed or the highest degree he received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree
- Bachelor degree
- Graduate degree

7. What is the highest level of school your mother completed or the highest degree she received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree
8. In what branch and unit did you serve?

- USMC Infantry
- USMC MARSOC (Raiders, Force Recon, Recon BN, Scout Sniper)
- US Navy SEAL
- US Navy SWCC SBU
- US Army Special Forces or CAG
- US Army Rangers
- US Air Force Para Rescue
- Aviation 160th
- Other (please specify)

9. What was your highest military rank?

- E1–E4
- E5–E6
- E7–E8
- E-9
- O1–O3
- O4–O5
- O6
10. Other than English, what languages do you speak at any level?

- Chinese
- Italian
- Japanese
- German
- Portuguese
- Arabic
- French
- Russian
- Farsi
- Thai
- Other (please specify)

11. How important is it to understand the culture for you to be successful at your job?

- I do not really understand different cultures and do not think it is necessary for me to adjust my behavior to conform while working in a different culture. If I remain true to by beliefs, I will be able to work in any cultural environment.
- I understand culture differences; however, find little to no value in accepting culture and do not see this as an important part of me being successful while working in a different culture.
- I think that understanding culture is important but do not feel it necessary for me to change my behavior to be successful in working within a different culture.
- I think understanding culture and adjusting my behavior while working with a different culture is an important and contributing factor to be successful while working in a different culture environment.
12. Please chose the best answer below. Be sure to read carefully the definition of combat for the use of this survey.

- Have not served in combat
- Have served in combat and received Combat Action Badge or Ribbon but with little or limited contact to firefights or IED's
- Have served in combat and received Combat Action Badge or Ribbon and exposed to heavy firefights and IED's

13. On how many combat deployments have you been?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3 or more

14. How long have you been out of the military?

- 1-4 years
- 4-6 years
- 6-10 years
- 10-15 years

15. Where are you currently working? Select all that apply.

- currently working overseas as a contractor, direct hire or in some other connection to the United States Government or private business
- Not currently working
- Some form of advanced education (tech school, formal school, College)
16. I would consider myself to be culturally tolerant and do not offend others around me that may be from a different culture or religious belief

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neutral
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

17. In some situations I find it helpful to place others' cultural considerations ahead of my personal cultural beliefs

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neutral
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly disagree

18. I engage when I am immersed in different cultures

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
19. I find myself more cautious when working in cross-cultural situations and think more about my words and actions

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neutral
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

20. I understand and appreciate the diversity of cross-cultural situations or environments

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neutral
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
Appendix E

Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) – Self-Report *

Read each statement and select the response that best describes your capabilities.
Select the answer that BEST describes you AS YOU REALLY ARE (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CQ Factor</th>
<th>Questionnaire Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivational CQ:</strong> (CQ Drive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT1</td>
<td>I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT2</td>
<td>I am confident that I can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT3</td>
<td>I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT4</td>
<td>I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOT5</td>
<td>I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in a different culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive CQ:</strong> (CQ Knowledge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG1</td>
<td>I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG2</td>
<td>I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG3</td>
<td>I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG4</td>
<td>I know the marriage systems of other cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG5</td>
<td>I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQG6</td>
<td>I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metacognitive CQ</strong> (CQ Strategy):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC1</td>
<td>I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC2</td>
<td>I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC3</td>
<td>I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC4</td>
<td>I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral CQ:</strong> (CQ Action)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH1</td>
<td>I change my verbal behavior (e.g., accent, tone) when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH2</td>
<td>I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH3</td>
<td>I vary the rate of my speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH4</td>
<td>I change my non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation requires it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH5</td>
<td>I alter my facial expressions when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* © Cultural Intelligence Center 2005. Used by permission of Cultural Intelligence Center.
Note: Use of this scale granted to academic researchers for research purposes only.
For information on using the scale for purposes other than academic research (e.g., consultants and non-academic organizations), please email admin@culturaliq.com.
Appendix F

Qualitative Open-Ended Questionnaire

Please read all four of the following definitions prior to answering this question. After you understand each definition place a number 1–4 next to each definition, with 1 the most important to 4 the least important. After ranking the definitions, state your reason for the choices you made; one to two short paragraphs are appropriate. As this is a qualitative survey, your complete responses are required to fulfill its use.

Cognitive defines the beginning of your learning process. Family and friends may pass along feelings and beliefs at this developmental stage to influence your personal culture and belief system. These may form your primary feelings about other cultures and relationships in cross-cultural situations.

Metacognitive represents the control of your cognitive learning and how you approach that knowledge in any given situation.

Motivation follows on your metacognitive ability and how personally motivated you are to act in any given situation. In this case, it concerns your motivation to involve yourself in cross-cultural settings and participate with others.

Behavior signifies verbal and physical gestures that you use when working within a cross-cultural environment. This is the product that is viewed by others around you. Think of this in a strictly cross-cultural environment; as in, is your behavior important in a cross-cultural environment.

1. According to what you believe, rank the four words listed below from 1–4, with 1 the most important and 4 the least important. There are no wrong answers here; it is simply what you believe.

   - Behavior
   - Motivation
   - Cognitive
   - Metacognitive

2. Please explain and describe your choices here in one to two short paragraphs.

3. In one to two short paragraphs, describe a negative experience involving a cross-cultural situation during your military service. This does not have to be a personal story; it may be one of which you know.

4. In one to two short paragraphs please describe a positive experience involving a cross-cultural situation while you were in the military. This does not have to be a personal story; it may be one of which you know.
5. While on active duty, did you receive any cross-cultural or cultural training? This includes all cultural training (sexual harassment, racism, Arab culture, etc.)

If your answer was yes to question #5, please comment on the training you received.

What are the visible factors you associate as key indicators of one’s culture? Rank these factors in importance from 1–5, with 1 most important and 5 least important. See Figure 1 below: Iceberg Theory of Culture

- Literature, fine arts, music, and dancing
- Games
- Cooking
- Dress
- Religion

8. In at least one paragraph, please provide an explanation of your choices ranked in question #7.

9. What are the hidden factors you believe are underlining indicators of a culture? Rank these factors in importance 1–9, with 1 most important and 9 least important. Again, see Figure 1 below: Iceberg Theory of Culture

- Courtship practice and sexual behavior
- Nature of friendship
- Patterns of handling emotions
- Arrangements of physical space
- Approaches to problem solving
- Appearance and how beauty is perceived
- Work ethic
- Definition of sin
- Relationship to animals

10. In at least one paragraph, please explain your choices to questions #9.

11. Does stress, especially combat stress, place a positive or a negative outcome on cross-cultural relationships?

   Positive
   Negative

12. Please explain your reasoning to your answers in question #11 and provide a personal experience if available.
13. As a Special Operations Force member, which do you value more: education or practical immersion training?
   Education
   Practical Immersion Training
   An even or weighted combination of both, please explain below

14. Please provide the reason behind your selection in question #13.

Figure 1. Iceberg Theory of Culture